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BETTER LATE THAN NEVER: WHY THE USOC TOOK SO
LONG TO FIX A FAILING SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING
OLYMPIC ATHLETES FROM ABUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
At the 2012 Summer Olympic Games in London, the United
States sent 530 athletes to compete, a team comprised of 269 wo-
men and 261 men.1  This was the first time women outnumbered
men on Team USA, and the United States was on the leading side
of a worldwide trend of increasing female participation at the
Olympic Games.2  The 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio set a record
for female participants at forty-five percent and the United States
broke its own record from 2012 with 292 female participants out of
555 athletes.3  However, this increase in female participation has
not been without a significant number of sexual misconduct allega-
tions made against adults connected to Olympic sport
organizations.4
1. See Bill Chappell, Year of the Woman at the London Games? For Americans, It’s
True, NPR (Aug. 10, 2012, 1:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetorch/
2012/08/10/158570021/year-of-the-woman-at-the-london-games-for-americans-its-
true [https://perma.cc/Q3KR-MF36] (reporting statistics of athlete participation
at London Olympic Games).
2. See id. (discussing impressive feats achieved by women at 2012 Olympics
and noting for United States in particular it was “Year of the Woman at the
Olympics”).
3. See Claire Warner, How Many Female Athletes Are Competing in the 2016 Olym-
pics? The Rio Games Are Worth Watching, BUSTLE (July 24, 2016), https://
www.bustle.com/articles/174518-how-many-female-athletes-are-competing-in-the-
2016-olympics-the-rio-games-are-worth-watching [https://perma.cc/G99J-G2RE]
(discussing increase in female participation at Olympics and historic achievement
of these elite female athletes).
4. See Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Every Six Weeks for More Than 36 Years: When
Will Sex Abuse in Olympic Sports End?, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/sports/every-six-weeks-for-more-than-36-years-when-will-
sex-abuse-in-olympic-sports-end/2017/11/17/286ae804-c88d-11e7-8321-481fd63f
174d_story.html?utm_term=.f6bd60c16ef0 [https://perma.cc/8HY7-ACPL] (not-
ing “[m]ore than 290 coaches and officials associated with the United States’
Olympic sports organizations have been publicly accused of sexual misconduct
since 1982” which has spanned across “15 sports and amounts to an average of
eight adults connected to an Olympic organization accused of sexual misconduct
every year—or about one every six weeks—for more than 36 years”); see also
Warner, supra note 3 (discussing growing number of women athletes participating R
in Olympics).  This Comment refers to perpetrators as male and victims or com-
plainants as female.  While the author recognizes that there are certainly excep-
tions, this Comment primarily addresses how the legal voids within the Ted Stevens
Olympic and Amateur Sports Act and a culture of resisting change affects female
athletes.
(157)
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The sexual assault allegations referred to herein taint the oth-
erwise historic achievement and growing number of female sport
opportunities at the Olympics.5  Since 1982, over 290 coaches and
officials within the United States’ Olympic sport organizations have
faced public accusations of sexual misconduct.6  The latest scandal,
amongst a series of publicized incidents, involves the United States
National Gymnastics Team (“USA Gymnastics”).7  In 2015, sexual
abuse claims were filed against Larry Nassar, a former USA Gymnas-
tics team doctor.8  In 2017, notable Olympic gymnasts and gold
medalists McKayla Maroney, Aly Raisman, Gabby Douglas, and Si-
mone Biles joined the 150-plus female athletes in publicly accusing
Larry Nassar of sexual abuse.9  This case is not an isolated incident,
but rather continues to highlight preventable errors committed by
Olympic sport organizations that have put numerous children at
risk.10  Nassar has since pled guilty to sexually assaulting ten girls
and has been sentenced to sixty years on federal child pornography
charges and forty to 125 years for molesting young girls under the
guise of medical treatment.11
For years, sexual assault has occurred in numerous Olympic
sport organizations as a result of a culture that prioritizes limited
5. See generally Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (discussing growing problem of R
sexual abuse in Olympic sport organizations).
6. See id. (discussing statistics of sexual abuse spanning last three decades).
7. See id. (discussing sexual abuse claims against USA Gymnastics and former
team doctor Larry Nassar).
8. See id. (discussing origination of claims, and continuation of claims arising
after first report against Nassar).
9. See generally Christine Hauser, McKayla Maroney, Describing Sexual Abuse, Calls
Larry Nassar a ‘Monster of a Human Being’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/sports/mckayla-maroney-larry-nassar.html
[https://perma.cc/XAA5-YHNT] (discussing notable gymnasts who have spoken
publicly claiming abuse by Larry Nassar); see also Tracy Connor, Larry Nassar Accuser
Count is Up to 265, Judge Says, NBC NEWS (Jan. 31, 2018, 1:58 PM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/larry-nassar-accuser-count-265-judge-says-
n843316 [https://perma.cc/KD69-FA9T] (noting 150 women made impact state-
ments at Larry Nassar’s sentencing, but over 265 females have claimed Nassar sexu-
ally abused them).
10. See Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (quoting Katherine Starr, former R
Olympic swimmer and abuse victim, stating, “[w]e’re hearing all about gymnastics,
but the problems in gymnastics are equally as prevalent in every other sport”).
11. See Tracy Connor, Coach Slams Gymnastics Doctor Larry Nassar for Hiding His
Face, NBC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2018, 4:20 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/coach-slams-gymnastics-doctor-larry-nassar-hiding-his-face-n838396 [https://
perma.cc/9GNX-PVMX] (discussing Nassar’s sentencing hearing where over 150
women accused him of sexually assaulting them, charges against him and disgrace
filling the courtroom).
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legal risk and gold medals over safeguarding children.12  The
United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”) has resisted change
and continues to exhibit flaws in its responses to suspicions of
abuse.13  Historically, the USOC has employed ineffective procedu-
ral safeguards to protect Olympic athletes, particularly with respect
to underage females.14
This Comment explains the fundamental issues within the
Olympic organization, exploring its history of turning a blind eye to
sexual abuse allegations coupled with ineffective methods of remov-
ing abuse from sports.15  This Comment argues that the USOC is in
the best position to combat the issue of sexual abuse.16  Further,
this Comment argues that changing the culture of youth sport
should begin with the USOC and trickle down to the National Gov-
erning Bodies (“NGBs”).17  Part II of this Comment discusses the
previous and current governing law that the USOC must follow, in-
cluding the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act (“Ted
Stevens Act”) and the Protecting Young Victims from Sexual Abuse
and Safe Sport Authorization Act of 2017 (“SafeSport Act”).18  Part
II also examines sexual abuse scandals within several NGBs.19  Part
III analyzes the sexual abuse that has plagued the Olympic organi-
zations for decades by looking at legal cases against the USOC, fo-
cusing particularly on the recent scandals within USA Swimming
and USA Gymnastics.20  Part III also analyzes changes to federal law
and discusses the nondisclosure agreement (“NDA”) process and
12. See id. (discussing resistance to change by USOC and highlighting reasons
for why abuse cases continue to rise in Olympic sport organizations).
13. See id. (stating USOC has resisted change to federal law governing it, de-
spite flawed responses officials have historically given to suspicions of abuse).
14. See Haley O. Morton, License to Abuse: Confronting Coach-Inflicted Sexual As-
sault in American Olympic Sports, 23 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 141, 143 (2016)
(“Olympic athletes, mostly underage females, have almost no effective grievance
procedure within their own National Governing Bodies (NGB), nor do they have
statutory grounds for a civil suit, to combat sexual abuse from coaches.”).
15. For further discussion of the fundamental issues within the Olympic or-
ganization, see infra notes 24–29 and accompanying text R
16. For further discussion of the changes that should be made by the USOC
to combat sexual abuse, see infra notes 168–197 and accompanying text. R
17. For further discussion of the USOC’s ability to combat the abuse, see infra
notes 167–197 and accompanying text. R
18. For further discussion of the Ted Stevens Act, see infra notes 65–76 and R
accompanying text.
19. For further discussion of the sexual abuse within Olympic sport organiza-
tions, see infra notes 97–160 and accompanying text. R
20. For further discussion of the scandals in USA gymnastics and USA Swim-
ming, see infra notes 100–119, 120–145, 223–227, 268–288, and accompanying R
text.
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legality of NDAs in this context.21  Finally, Part IV summarizes the
arguments made in this Comment.22
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Historically, Olympic athletes have had ineffective procedural
safeguards and reporting systems within their NGB for combating
sexual abuse by coaches and officials, leading to an ineffective re-
course process for athletes after sexual abuse has occurred.23  The
USOC has traditionally claimed that its hands are tied regarding
the issue of combatting sexual abuse situations, deferring to these
ineffective NGBs to take action.24  The USOC has only started rec-
ognizing the growing issues and improving its own safety policies in
the last three years.25  In 2017, the USOC implemented a new non-
profit agency, the U.S. Center for SafeSport (“SafeSport”), to deal
with suspected abuse in Olympic sport organizations.26  SafeSport
was supposed to begin operations in 2015; however, a lack of fund-
ing ultimately delayed its commencement until 2017.27  Recent
trends are shining a light on sexual abuse in Olympic sport organi-
zations and forcing the USOC and NGBs to start making the neces-
sary changes alongside the SafeSport Act, a law aimed at preventing
sexual abuse in amateur athletics.28  As the leader in the Olympic
21. For further discussion of the changes to federal law and the NDA process,
see infra notes 228–289 and accompanying text. R
22. For further discussion of the arguments made in this Comment, see infra
notes 289–298 and accompanying text. R
23. For further discussion of the historical procedural safeguards and report-
ing systems, see infra notes 161–197 and accompanying text. R
24. See Cecelia Townes, When USOC-Sanctioned Officials and Coaches are Accused
of Assault – Who is Responsible?, ESPNW (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.espn.com/
espnw/voices/article/18988930/when-usoc-sanctioned-officials-coaches-accused-
sexual-assault-responsible [https://perma.cc/4T9F-28WK] (“In instances of allega-
tions of sexual assault, the USOC has argued that the NGBs and local clubs that
employee coaches and officials are responsible for responding to claims of
misconduct.”).
25. See id. (discussing creation of U.S. Center for Safe Sport, but qualifying it
as very small step taken by USOC toward protection of athletes from sexual
assault).
26. See id. (discussing creation of SafeSport).
27. See id. (discussing delayed commencement of SafeSport).
28. See Protecting Young Victims From Sexual Abuse and Safe Sport Authori-
zation Act, Pub. L. No. 115-126, Title II, §§ 201-04, 132 Stat. 318, 320-25 (2018)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 34 U.S.C. and 36 U.S.C.)
(noting aim of new law is “to prevent the sexual abuse of minors and amateur
athletes by requiring the prompt reporting of sexual abuse to law enforcement
authorities”); see also Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (quoting statement by USOC R
board member Susanne Lyons, who, according to her statement: “think[s] we all
feel, in hindsight, how could we have let this take so long? . . . All up and down that
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organizations, it should be the USOC’s primary purpose to protect
its athletes.29
A. Structure of Olympic Sport Governance
Olympic sport governance in the United States is structured as
a pyramid.30  The USOC sits at the top of the pyramid, and is head-
quartered in Colorado Springs.31  Under the USOC sits forty-seven
Olympic and Pan American NGBs.32  There is one NGB for each
sport, such as USA Gymnastics and USA Swimming.33  Finally,
under the NGBs are the coaches and clubs sponsored by NGBs
which work directly with athletes, many of whom are children.34
1. United States Olympic Committee
The USOC, serving as both National Olympic Committee and
National Paralympic Committee, is a multifunctional committee.35
Congress created the USOC in 1894 to oversee the NGBs, stating its
mission as “support[ing] U.S. Olympic and Paralympic athletes in
achieving sustained competitive excellence while demonstrating
the values of the Olympic Movement, thereby inspiring all Ameri-
cans.”36  The Committee is responsible for training, entering, and
funding United States teams, primarily for the Olympic and
Paralympic Games.37  But its responsibilities are not limited solely
to the Games themselves and the Olympic Movement.38  The USOC
food chain, there were failures in the system that I think everyone regrets . . . The
best we can do now is just go forward aggressively”).
29. See Townes, supra note 24 (“While the USOC may have delegated certain R
duties to its NGBs, it is ultimately the USOC’s purpose to protect its athletes.”).
30. See Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (discussing bureaucracy overseeing R
Olympic sport organizations).
31. See id. (discussing USOC as overarching body governing all United States
Olympic organizations).
32. See id. (discussing NGBs, many of which are also headquartered in Colo-
rado Springs).
33. See id. (discussing NGBs and tumultuous events surrounding USA Gym-
nastics in particular).
34. See id. (discussing fundraising mechanism of NGBs to allow coaches and
clubs “across the country the opportunity to use the prestige of an association with
the Olympics to attract top students”).
35. See About the USOC, TEAM USA (2018), https://www.teamusa.org/About-
the-USOC [https://perma.cc/BT37-5DEY] (discussing role of USOC).
36. Id. (discussing history of USOC).
37. See id. (describing USOC as “responsible for the training, entering and
funding of U.S. teams for the Olympic, Paralympic, Youth Olympic, Pan American
and Parapan American Games, while serving as a steward of the Olympic Move-
ment throughout the country”).
38. See id. (discussing additional roles of USOC that do not revolve around
support during actual competition); see also Leading the Olympic Movement,
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is also responsible for aiding athletes through their NGBs, “provid-
ing financial support and jointly working to develop customized,
creative and impactful athlete-support and coaching education pro-
grams.”39  Most importantly, the USOC prides itself on supporting
athletes “on and off the field of play” and providing Olympic Train-
ing Center facilities for athletes, which include sports medicine,
strength and conditioning, and psychology.40
2. National Governing Bodies
The forty-seven NGBs sit below the USOC in the governance
structure of the Olympic organization and play a direct role with
athletes.41  Each NGB is responsible for abiding by the rules and
regulations of the Ted Stevens Act and its recent amendment,
which together lay out several duties pertaining to sports develop-
ment and coaching.42  NGBs are responsible for selecting and send-
ing athletes to the Olympic Games and supporting the growth of
the sport down to youth levels.43  Essentially, under the supervision
of the USOC, the NGBs of each sport follow their own procedures
of checks and balances and democratic processes.44
3. U.S. Center for SafeSport
SafeSport opened in 2017, acting as the “first and only national
organization of its kind.”45  SafeSport focuses on ending all forms
of abuse in sports, which includes addressing claims of bullying and
OLYMPIC.ORG, https://www.olympic.org/the-ioc/leading-the-olympic-movement
[https://perma.cc/U8GA-27L5] (last visited July 19, 2018) (“The Olympic Move-
ment is the concerted, organised, universal and permanent action, carried out
under the supreme authority of the IOC, of all individuals and entities who are
inspired by the values of Olympism . . . The goal of the Olympic Movement is to
contribute to building a peaceful and better world by educating youth through
sport practised in accordance with Olympism and its values.”).
39. About the USOC, supra note 35 (emphasis added). R
40. See id. (noting USOC’s provision of performance services for athletes).
41. See generally Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (discussing Olympic organiza- R
tion’s hierarchical structure).
42. See Lisa Marshall, Report Card Gives U.S. Olympic Sports a D for Self-Govern-
ance, CU BOULDER TODAY (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.colorado.edu/today/
2017/11/30/report-card-gives-us-olympic-sports-d-self-governance [https://
perma.cc/F8UL-2Q8M] (discussing responsibilities of NGBs, including self-gov-
erning Olympic sports in United States).
43. See id. (noting one primary role of NGBs is to select athletes for Olympic
Games).
44. See generally id. (discussing USOC supervision of NGBs and reports of how
well functioning certain NGBs are based on evaluation done for democratic pro-
cess, transparency, checks and balances, and solidarity).
45. Who We Are, U.S. CTR. FOR SAFESPORT, https://safesport.org/who-we-are
(last visited Jan. 17, 2019).
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harassment in addition to physical and emotional sexual miscon-
duct.46  SafeSport seeks to foster a national sport culture of respect,
safety, and support for athletes both on and off the playing field.47
In response to a lacking system in the Olympic Movement for han-
dling sexual abuse, SafeSport investigates and resolves alleged pol-
icy violations of the SafeSport Code for the forty-seven NGBs within
the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic organizations.48
In 2010, prior to the SafeSport Act, the USOC formed a work-
ing group with an initiative to better protect athletes and develop
recommendations regarding misconduct in sport.49  The group cre-
ated SafeSport as a nonprofit to “respond to abuse claims and im-
plement a unified set of policies for preventing, identifying and
reporting misconduct among the 47 national governing bodies
(NGBs) that oversee USOC sports.”50  SafeSport initially did not
create any legal obligation, rather the USOC “required all NGB’s,
as a condition of membership, to implement athlete safety poli-
cies.”51  However, in 2017, the SafeSport Act codified a legal obliga-
tion by placing a duty on any adults working with minor athletes to
report any suspicion of sexual abuse.52  SafeSport is required to
fully investigate any claims of sexual assault and report to law en-
46. See Cecelia Townes, Q&A With Shellie Pfohl, CEO of the U.S. Center for
SafeSport, ESPNW (Apr. 6 2017), http://www.espn.com/espnw/voices/article/
19082380/qa-shellie-pfohl-ceo-us-center-safesport [https://perma.cc/5TA5-
J7WW] (“The U.S. Center for SafeSport is designed to make sure that athletes are
safe, supported and strengthened through sports.  To that end, we address bully-
ing, harassment, hazing, as well as physical, emotional and sexual misconduct in
sport.”).
47. See generally id. (stating SafeSport will prevent future harm and respond to
already reported harm).
48. See id. (discussing SafeSport’s role in handling claims of sexual miscon-
duct, while noting work extends far beyond Olympic family as resource for all
youth sport organizations).
49. See Stephen Meyers, USOC CEO Provides Details on Initiative to Protect Ath-
letes, USA TODAY (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olym-
pics/2016/09/22/usoc-ceo-scott-blackmun-center-for-safe-sport/90868876/
[https://perma.cc/9EFY-XGGV] (noting USOC CEO Scott Blackmun’s recogni-
tion that “sexual abuse is obviously a societal issue” and “as leaders in the world of
sport, we have to do everything in our power to keep our athletes safe”).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See generally 34 U.S.C. § 20341 (providing adults’ reporting obligations);
see also SafeSport Code for the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Movement, U.S. CTR. FOR
SAFESPORT (effective Mar. 3, 2017), https://77media.blob.core.windows.net/
uscss/1488581091937.2017-03-03—-safesport-code—-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2UH9-Q3QG] (discussing how to foster “a sport community where all persons who
participate in sport programs and activities can work and learn together in an at-
mosphere free of all forms of emotional, physical and sexual misconduct”).
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forcement agencies within twenty-four hours.53  SafeSport is then
“authorized to and will issue sanctions up to and including being
[permanently] banned.”54
The USOC had ethics policies which required NGBs to adopt
minimum policy standards prior to SafeSport’s creation in 2015
and its official opening in 2017.55  The USOC had an ethics policy
that read: “Coaches do not engage in sexual/romantic relation-
ships with athletes or other participants over whom the coach has
evaluative, direct, or indirect authority, because such relationships
are likely to impair judgement or be exploitative.”56  The minimum
policy standards for NGBs, focusing on protecting athletes, did not
become a requirement until 2012 and NGBs were not required to
adopt the standards until December 2013.57  These policies target
the existing problems in the Olympic regime and serve as a baseline
for NGBs to follow as they attempt to improve their systems.58  The
policies included the following guidelines:
(1) Prohibited conduct includes bullying; hazing; harass-
ment (including sexual harassment); emotional mis-
conduct; physical misconduct; and sexual misconduct
(including child sexual abuse) between NGB employ-
ees, athletes, coaches and officials.59
53. See 34 U.S.C. § 20341(c)(12) (noting reporting requirement “as soon as
possible” means within 24-hours).
54. Townes, supra note 46; and see, e.g., Permanently Ineligible Members, USA R
Gymnastics,  https://usagym.org/pages/aboutus/pages/permanently_ineligible_
members.html [https://perma.cc/36K9-9WNM] (last visited July 19, 2018) (listing
publicly all persons permanently banned from membership with USA Gymnastics
with relevant rule or Bylaw that was violated listed next to his/her name).
55. See Morton, supra note 14, at 153–54 (discussing ill-equipped USOC and R
NGB’s for addressing abuse committed by sanctioned coaches); see also Meyers,
supra note 49 (noting USOC CEO Scott Blackmun’s statement that “[t]he USOC R
created the center after more than four years of developing protocols for prevent-
ing and reporting allegations of abuse”); see also United States Olympic Commit-
tee, U.S. Olympic Committee Announces Formation Of U.S. Center For Safe Sport Advisory
Council, TEAM USA (Feb. 9, 2015, 6:15 PM), https://www.teamusa.org/News/
2015/February/09/US-Olympic-Committee-Announces-Formation-Of-US-Center-
for-Safe-Sport-Advisory-Council [https://perma.cc/KZE5-BAX5] (discussing ap-
proval of independent entity SafeSport in June 2014 and announcement in 2015).
56. United States Olympic Committee Coaching Ethics Code, USA NAT’L KARATE-DO
FED’N, https://www.teamusa.org/USA-Karate/Officials-and-Coaches/Coaches-Re
sources/USOC-Coaching-Ethics-Code [https://perma.cc/M5P2-Z9HV] (last vis-
ited Feb. 6, 2018).
57. See Morton, supra note 14, at 153 (discussing requirement to adopt mini- R
mum standards placed by USOC on NGBs).
58. See id. at 154 (discussing minimum requirements and their progressive-
ness, but also their limited application).
59. See generally Minimum Standards Policy for Athlete Safety Programs, http://
www.usfsa.org/content/Minimum%20Standards%20Policy%20from%20USOC.
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(2) Each “NGB shall require criminal background checks
for those individuals it formally authorizes, approves
or appoints (a) to a position of authority over, or (b)
to have frequent contact with athletes.”60
(3) “Beginning January 1, 2014, each NGB shall require
education and training concerning the key elements
of their safety program for those individuals it for-
mally authorizes, approves or appoints (a) to a posi-
tion of authority over, or (b) to have frequent contact
with athletes.”61  “Before January 1, 2014, each NGB
shall offer and encourage the same.”62
(4) A requirement that “[e]ach NGB shall establish a pro-
cedure for reporting misconduct.”63
(5) A grievance process, free from bias and conflicts of
interest, to address misconduct allegations, and in
cases where the Ted Stevens Act applies, strict compli-
ance with the Act’s requirements.64
B. Governing Olympic Sports
1. The Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act
The Ted Stevens Act is one of the current laws governing
Olympic sport organizations and, prior to 2018, was the most appli-
cable source of sports law for American Olympic sports.65  Congress
passed the Ted Stevens Act in response to a lack of internal organi-
zation within Olympic governance.66  Although the USOC has gov-
erning powers over United States Olympic sports, both the USOC
and NGBs must still comply with the Ted Stevens Act in protecting
pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ6U-GRB8] (last visited Feb. 6, 2018) (referring to pro-
hibited conduct under policy).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. (referring to enforcement of policy and grievance process).
65. See Matthew Mitten, Legal Protection of Sports Participation Opportunities in the
United States of America, FOR THE RECORD: THE OFFICIAL NEWSLETTER OF THE NAT’L
SPORTS L. INST., 1, 2 (2008), https://law.marquette.edu/assets/sports-law/pdf/for-
the-record/v19i4.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2BQ-MNNF] (discussing legal protec-
tion of Olympic sports athletic participation opportunities under Ted Stevens Act);
see also Morton, supra note 14, at 150 (“While Title IX provides remedies for stu- R
dents and student-athletes experiencing sexual assault, the [Ted Stevens Act] only
implicates athletes seeking solutions to issues affecting their ability to participate in
competition.”).
66. See Morton, supra note 14, at 150 (discussing origination of Ted Stevens R
Act in response to “intra-organizational political ‘squabbles’”).
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athletes’ ability to participate in competition.67  Under the Ted Ste-
vens Act, the USOC must establish a procedure for “swift and equi-
table resolution of disputes relating to” Olympic athlete
participation, guaranteeing all athletes, officials, and coaches “fair
notice, due process and a hearing in the event of a dispute.”68
Although athletes are ineligible to be USOC members, the Ted
Stevens Act requires an election of an Athletes’ Advisory Council
(“AAC”) to ensure open lines of communication with the USOC
and adequate representation of athlete interests.69  The mission of
the AAC is “to communicate the interests and protect the rights of
athletes, in cooperative support of the USOC achieving its mis-
sion.”70  The Ted Stevens Act also requires athletes to hold a mini-
mum of twenty percent of the membership and voting power held
by its Board of Directors, committees, and each NGB.71  Finally, the
Ted Stevens Act requires the NGBs provide all athletes with an
equal opportunity to participate without “discrimination on the ba-
sis of race, color, religion, sex, age, or national origin.”72  If there is
an issue regarding an athlete’s participation (e.g., challenges to
standards for selecting athletes to participate in United States com-
petitions or accusations of substance abuse), the USOC must enact
a swift resolution on its own, while the NGB launches a concurrent
67. See Mitten, supra note 65, at 2 (citing 36 U.S.C. §220501 (2008)) (noting R
both USOC and each NGB must comply with Ted Stevens Act).
68. Id. at 3 (citing 23 U.S.C. § §220509(a)) (discussing “swift and equitable
resolution”); see also Will Hobson, Senator Dianne Feinstein Calls for Changes to
Olympic Sports Law to Protect Children from Abuse, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2017), https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2017/02/22/senator-dianne-fein
stein-calls-for-changes-to-olympic-sports-law-to-protect-children-from-abuse/?utm_
term=.8495a9f39227 [https://perma.cc/WBR8-J59G] (discussing framework of
Ted Stevens Act, and setting forth requirements in event of dispute); see also Mat-
thew J. Mitten, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and Legal Protection of Sports Participation
Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 93 (2008) (discussing protection of Ted
Stevens Act over Olympic sport disputes).
69. See Mitten, supra note 65, at 2 (noting certain requirements of Ted Ste- R
vens Act); see also Athletes’ Advisory Council, TEAM USA, https://www.teamusa.org/
athlete-resources/athletes-advisory-council [https://perma.cc/7DX6-GHJ3] (last
visited July 2, 2018) (“The [Athletes’ Advisory Council] consists of at least one
athlete from each National Governing Body (NGB) which the United States is rep-
resented at the Olympic and Pan American Games, eight athletes representing the
Paralympic Sport Organizations or NGBs designated to govern a Paralympic sport,
and six athletes elected by the AAC to serve at-large, including a chair and two vice
chairs.”).
70. Athletes’ Advisory Council, supra note 69. R
71. See Mitten, supra note 65, at 2 (citing 36 U.S.C. §§ 220504(b)(2), R
220522(a)(1), and 220522(a)(8)) (noting voting requirements for athletes under
Ted Stevens Act).
72. Id. (citing 36 U.S.C. §220504(a)(8)).
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internal investigation.73  Ultimately, an athlete that is dissatisfied
with the outcome of an investigation may submit to a final and
binding arbitration.74  This arbitration takes place between the ath-
lete, the NGB, and a single arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators.75
The arbitrators decision in settling the dispute is based on a conclu-
sion of law and factual determination of whether (1) the athlete
had a fair opportunity to qualify for protected competitions, and
(2) the NGB’s selection process was “fair, reasonable, and consist-
ently applied to all athletes.”76  Because this process is binding, a
court will only interfere if an arbitrator did not have sufficient au-
thority, or exceeded the authority granted, to rule on the specific
issue at hand.77  As discussed in Gault v. United States Bobsled & Skele-
ton Foundation,78 the standard of review of an arbitrator’s decision is
only limited scrutiny.79
73. See Mitten, supra note 65, at 2, 4 n.29 (discussing arbitration procedures R
for traditional challenges, such as athlete selection, follow “rational basis” test,
while those involving doping disputes follow special arbitration process between
arbitrator, U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, and athlete); see also Olympic Athlete Eligibility,
NGB Determination, and Doping Disputes: An Overview, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://
www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Olympic+Athlete+Eligibili
ty.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4VN-CT7N] (last visited July 2, 2018).  The expedited
arbitration process can be illustrated using the following example: “Three days
prior to the opening of the Nagano Games in ‘98, an Olympic skier filed an arbi-
tration. The AAA acted quickly and had an arbitration hearing scheduled within
24 hours; the arbitrator decided the skier was eligible for the games.” Id.
74. See Mitten, supra note 65, at 4 n.29 (noting final and binding arbitration R
must be in accordance with Commercial Rules of American Arbitration Associa-
tion); see also Michael S. Straubel, Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control
Process in International Sport, 106 DICK. L. REV. 523, 534 (2002) (discussing due pro-
cess for athletes suspended for doping, allowing athletes right to hearing, challeng-
ing her ineligibility under Ted Stevens Act, first to NGB, then to USOC, finishing
with appeal to American Arbitration Association).
75. See Mitten, supra note 65, at 4 (discussing who is normally selected as arbi- R
trator or member of panel).
76. Id. at 2, 4 (citing In re Arbitration between Sean Wolf and U.S. Rowing
Ass’n, Case No. 30 190 00635 02 (American Arb. Ass’n, Aug. 9, 2002) and In re
Arbitration between Rebecca Conzelman, Case No. 30 190 404 04 (American Arb.
Ass’n, April 6, 2004)) (discussing arbitration process and illustrative obligations of
arbitration panel).
77. See Mitten, supra note 65, at 4 (citing Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Ass’n, R
Inc., 227 F.3d 1000, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000)) (discussing limited circumstances when
courts will interfere with arbitration process).
78. 578 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
79. See Mitten, supra note 65, at 4 (quoting court in Gault) (“[A]lthough we R
also may disagree with the arbitrator’s award and find most unfortunate the in-
creasing frequency with which sporting events are resolved in the courtroom, we
have no authority to upset it when the arbitrator did not exceed his authority.”); see
also Lindland., 227 F.3d at 1003 (noting courts will vacate or refuse to affirm arbi-
trators award if it is “result of ‘corruption,’ ‘fraud,’ ‘evident partiality,’ or any simi-
lar bar to confirmation”).
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Despite the Ted Stevens Act providing some protection of ath-
letes’ ability to participate in the Olympics, courts have continu-
ously held that athletes have no constitutional right to participate
in the Olympic Games.80  For example, in DeFrantz v. USOC81 the
Court determined the USOC is a private organization rather than a
state actor.82  Thus, the USOC is not subject to the constraints of
the United States Constitution, and further, even if its conduct was
considered “state action,” athletes still do not have a constitutional
right to participate in the Olympic Games.83  A Seventh Circuit
judge noted, “there can be few less suitable bodies than the federal
courts for determining the eligibility, or the procedures for deter-
mining the eligibility, of athletes to participate in the Olympic
Games.”84
2. United States Center for Safe Sport Authorization Act of 2017
The Ted Stevens Act was originally intended to resolve disputes
centered on participation in the Olympics; it did not directly speak
to sexual assault reporting.85  Recognizing the fragmented law and
the need for amendment, California United States Senator Dianne
Feinstein successfully lobbied Congress to amend the Ted Stevens
Act to include concrete processes and remedial actions when sexual
misconduct claims arise.86  In 2018, Congress passed the SafeSport
Act, aimed at preventing amateur athletes from systematic sexual
abuse.87  The law implements stronger abuse-prevention measures
by requiring any adult working with amateur athletes, therefore eve-
80. See Mitten, supra note 65, at 94 (“A U.S. athlete has no federal constitu- R
tional right to participate in the Olympic Games.”).
81. 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980).
82. See Mitten, supra note 65, at 2 (discussing lack of federal restraints on R
USOC).
83. See id. (discussing lack of constitutional protection for athletes regarding
participation in Olympics).
84. Id. at 5 (quoting Michels v. USOC, 741 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1984) (Pos-
ner, C.J., concurring)).
85. See generally Hobson, supra note 68 (discussing inadequacies of Ted Ste- R
vens Act for addressing sexual assault allegations and reporting).
86. See id. (discussing efforts made by individuals, rather than USOC, to
change law and better protect children).
87. See Maureen Groppe, Trump Signs Law to Protect Abuse of Athletes—A Re-
sponse to USA Gymnastics Scandal, INDYSTAR (Feb. 14, 2018, 6:54 PM), https://
www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2018/02/14/trump-signs-law-prevent-
abuse-athletes-response-usa-gymnastics-scandal/336879002/ [https://perma.cc/
V7HE-Z48V] (discussing recent bill aimed at protecting athletes from sexual
abuse, in part responding to sexual abuse scandal in USA Gymnastics, passed by
Congress and signed into law by President Donald Trump in February 2018).
12
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ryone who works under Olympic organizations, to be mandatory and
prompt reporters of suspected abuse.88
Although the USOC had already implemented SafeSport, the
SafeSport Act designates SafeSport as a nationally recognized or-
ganization, serving as the “independent national safe sport organi-
zation . . . for the United States.”89  The SafeSport Act, for the first
time in history, imposed a legal duty upon Olympic officials at all
levels to protect children from abuse.90  Under the SafeSport Act
there are: (1) requirements that all adult members of NGBs, or
adults authorized to work with amateur athletes, “report immedi-
ately any allegation” of sexual abuse; (2) mechanisms making this
reporting duty easy, without obstacle, and fully confidential; (3)
“procedures to limit one-on-one interactions between an amateur
athlete” and adults when under a NGB’s jurisdiction; (4) proce-
dures prohibiting retaliation against individual reporters of sexual
abuse; (5) oversight procedures by independent auditors to ensure
the law is properly followed; and (6) mechanisms for NGBs to pre-
vent adults, who are the subject of such sexual abuse allegations,
from working with minors.91  Additionally, the legislation “extends
the statute of limitations for victims to sue alleged perpetrators, rec-
ognizing that children sometimes don’t realize they were abused
until years later.”92  The statute of limitations does not begin until
the victim reaches the age of twenty-eight, or up to ten years after
the “reasonable discovery” of the abuse, whichever is later.93  Fi-
nally, the SafeSport Act creates a civil remedy for any minor who is
a victim of sexual assault and suffered a personal injury, allowing a
court to award punitive damages in addition to other equitable re-
88. See generally id. (discussing requirements of legislation, noting all adults
who interact with amateur athletes must report suspected child abuse, including
sexual abuse, within twenty-four hours to local law enforcement).
89. 36 U.S.C. § 220541(a)(1).
90. See generally Groppe, supra note 87 (noting SafeSport Act’s “aim[ ] to fix a R
patchwork of state reporting rules by requiring adults who interact with amateur
athletes to report suspected child abuse, including sexual abuse, within 24 hours to
local law enforcement”).
91. 36 U.S.C. § 220542(a)(2)(C) (discussing legal duties implemented by
SafeSport Act to prevent sexual abuse in sports); see also 36 U.S.C. § 220530 (not-
ing requirement that NGBs limit to one-on-one interactions between minors and
adults to situations of emergencies).
92. Associated Press, Following Larry Nassar Case, Congress Passes Bill Aiming to
Protect Amateur Athletes from Abuse, USA TODAY (Jan. 29, 2018, 7:45 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2018/01/29/congress-bill-aiming-protect-ama
teur-athletes-abuse/1077273001/ [https://perma.cc/G9VE-HWQ6].
93. Id. (noting SafeSport Act recognizes need for statute of limitations to ex-
tend beyond when victim realizes she has been abused).
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lief as appropriate.94  The USOC continuously announced its sup-
port for the bill, however, never lobbied Congress for changes as
Senator Feinstein did.95  The legislation, if effective moving for-
ward, should considerably improve young athletes’ safety.96
C. Claims Within NGBs
Over the last decade, numerous allegations of sexual miscon-
duct against various Olympic NGB’s have surfaced, some making
national headlines.97  The Larry Nassar scandal brought USA Gym-
nastics into the news, highlighting this specific sport for its failure
to protect its athletes from sexual abuse.98  Although USA Gymnas-
tics has found itself at the center of media backlash, the problems
of sexual misconduct are prevalent in other sports within the
Olympic sport organizations.99
1. USA Gymnastics
Larry Nassar began working in USA Gymnastics in 1986 and
continued in the organization until 2015, serving for four Olympic
Games and leaving just prior to the 2016 Summer Olympics in
Rio.100  Throughout Nassar’s career as a team doctor for both USA
Gymnastics and Michigan State University athletics, victims claim
they reported numerous cases of Nassar’s abuse, dating back to
94. See 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (noting such persons who were victims of sexual
assault under SafeSport Act may sue in civil court and recover actual damages or
liquidated damages of $150,000, and any associated costs, in addition to punitive
damages when appropriate).
95. See Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (discussing working group created by R
USOC focused on abuse prevention and never suggested changes to Ted Stevens
Act because not “part of [their] strategy,” but option of pushing Congress for
change to Ted Stevens Act was available to USOC to improve policies known to be
inadequate).
96. See id. (discussing positive impact changing law should have on Olympic
sport organizations).
97. See id. (noting problems exist across all sports, but public only hears about
headlines).
98. See id. (noting “[w]hile the Nassar case has captured public attention be-
cause of the renown of a few of his accusers, it is far from an isolated instance”).
99. See id. (noting “[t]he problem of sexual abuse in Olympic sports organiza-
tions extends well beyond the confines of one sport, or one executive,” as more
than 290 coaches and officials from more than fifteen sports within the United
States Olympic organization have been accused of sexual misconduct since 1982).
100. See Ryan Connors, Larry Nassar Case: What You Need to Know About Former
Michigan State, USA Gymnastics Doctor, AJC (2018), https://www.ajc.com/sports/col
lege/larry-nassar-case-what-you-need-know-about-former-michigan-state-usa-gym-
nastics-doctor/ifjJOn0xbVitNMgpNb3e5K/ [https://perma.cc/B7LS-RBT2] (dis-
cussing Nassar’s career as team doctor from 1986 to 2015 with USA Gymnastics
and 1997 to 2016 with Michigan State University).
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1997, but neither organization took action.101  Documented com-
plaints show that in 2015, USA Gymnastics received a sexual abuse
complaint about Nassar, but officials waited five weeks from the first
complaint to inform law enforcement of the allegations.102  How-
ever, Michigan State University, where Nassar continued to work
with young athletes, was not informed of the claims until August
2016.103  The alleged victims filed suit in September 2016, claiming
USA Gymnastics “not only hid complaints about Nassar, it failed to
adequately supervise his activities.”104
In 2017, USA Gymnastics team member and Olympic gold
medalist McKayla Maroney filed suit against the USOC and USA
Gymnastics.105  Maroney alleged that officials attempted to keep
her silent regarding the sexual abuse she suffered while being
treated by former team doctor Larry Nassar.106  Maroney also al-
leged that the USOC knowingly concealed Nassar’s misconduct.107
The USOC has denied all knowledge of the payout by USA Gymnas-
tics to Maroney as a part of the settlement.108  In addition to mak-
ing claims that the USOC has overlooked sexual abuse of minors
for decades, Maroney seeks to nullify an NDA she signed as a settle-
ment deal with USA Gymnastics in December 2016.109  Maroney’s
101. See id. (discussing “detailed examples of accusers whose complaints
about Nassar appeared to fall on deaf ears”).
102. See id. (discussing lack of USA Gymnastics urgency in addressing
allegations).
103. See id. (discussing USA Gymnastics’ failure to alert Nassar’s current em-
ployer of allegations, arguably allowing him to continue abusing athletes).
104. Tim Evans et al., Former USA Gymnastics Doctor Accused of Abuse, INDYSTAR
(Jan. 24, 2018, 4:35 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2016/09/12/for
mer-usa-gymnastics-doctor-accused-abuse/89995734/ [https://perma.cc/9X8J-
9H9M].
105. See Richard Winton et al., McKayla Maroney Accuses USOC and USA Gym-
nastics of Covering Up Sexual Abuse with Secret Settlement, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2017,
12:50 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-maroney-gynnastics-settle
ment-20171220-story.html [https://perma.cc/U4T2-NTB4] (discussing Maroney’s
lawsuit claiming Nasser’s sexual abuse and USOC and USA Gymnastics’ conceal-
ment of knowledge).
106. See id. (discussing Maroney’s confidentiality agreement and monetary
settlement with USA Gymnastics).
107. See id. (indicating USOC was also one defendant and claims it had “fun-
damentally flawed” system for preventing abuse and protecting children).
108. See id. (reporting USOC has continuously denied all allegations of knowl-
edge and concealment of sexual abuse).
109. See Alyssa Bailey, Chrissy Teigen Pledges to Pay $100K Fine for McKayla Ma-
roney, ELLE (Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.elle.com/culture/career-politics/a151746
40/mckayla-maroney-larry-nassar-nda-chrissy-teigen-response/ [https://perma.cc/
PV82-F4F2] (detailing how NDA Maroney signed as part of settlement deal with
USA Gymnastics would require Maroney to pay large fine if she speaks about al-
leged abuse or agreement).
15
Murphy: Better Late than Never: Why the USOC Took So Long To Fix a Failin
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\26-1\VLS105.txt unknown Seq: 16 21-FEB-19 11:54
172 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26: p. 157
attorney argues that “requiring [Maroney] to sign an NDA was ma-
nipulative and unlawful,” and further noted that confidentiality
agreements in child sex abuse cases are unlawful in California.110
California’s current law “treads a smart middle ground” regarding
NDAs for sexual crimes, prohibiting them for the types of sexual
crimes that could rise to the level of felonies or those perpetrated
against children.111  Maroney has been outspoken about her abuse,
breaking her NDA through a social media post in October 2017 to
share her harrowing experience.112  Maroney also gave a victim im-
pact statement at Nassar’s sentencing hearing, stating “[h]e abused
my trust, he abused my body and he left scars on my psyche that
may never go away . . . he needs to be behind bars so he will never
prey upon another child.”113
Maroney’s complaint attacks the USOC’s failures over the last
few decades.114  It claims that “the USOC continued to overlook
sexual abuse of minors . . . cit[ing] a 1999 letter from then-USA
110. See Alanna Vagianos, McKayla Maroney Signed Confidentiality Agreement with
USA Gymnastics About Alleged Sexual Abuse, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 21, 2017, 3:21
PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/mckayla-maroney-abuse-confidentia
lity_us_5a3aa78ee4b0b0e5a79f167a [https://perma.cc/NTN6-FKW7] (“Maroney’s
lawyer says USA Gymnastics broke the law by asking her to agree to the
settlement.”).
111. See Jessica Levinson, Non-Disclosure Agreements Can Enable Abusers. Should
We Get Rid of NDAs for Sexual Harassment?, NBC THINK (Jan. 24, 2018), https://
www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/non-disclosure-agreements-can-enable-abusers-
should-we-get-rid-ncna840371 [https://perma.cc/6GWZ-F9RB] (“Essentially in
California, parties cannot enter into a confidential settlement agreement for the
worst types of sexual crimes—those that rise of the level of felonies or are perpe-
trated against children.  But the state does allow agreements in other cases.  Ulti-
mately, California may strike the balance about as well as any government can.”)
112. See Victor Mather, Olympic Gymnast McKayla Maroney Says She Too Was Mo-
lested by Team Doctor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
10/18/sports/olympics/gymnast-mckayla-maroney-team-doctor-sexual-abuse.html
[https://perma.cc/94ZV-CXGQ].  In this since deleted Twitter post, Maroney
stated the following:
For me, the scariest night of my life happened when I was 15 years old.  I
had flown all day and night with the team to get to Tokyo. [Nassar had]
given me a sleeping pill for the flight, and the next thing I know, I was all
alone with him in his hotel room getting a ‘treatment’.  [sic] I thought I
was going to die that night.
Id.
113. Scott M. Reid, Mckayla Maroney’s Letter to Judge in Larry Nassar Child Porn
Case, ORANGE CTY. REG. (Dec. 6, 2017, 10:22 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/
2017/12/06/mckayla -maroney-letter-to-judge-in-nassar-child-porn-case/ [https://
perma.cc/TUG4-T7YZ] (discussing statement in Maroney’s victim letter, read at
Larry Nassar’s sentencing hearing in January 2018).
114. See Winton, supra note 105 (noting complaint points out actions USA R
Gymnastics and USOC could have taken decades earlier, when problems of sexual
abuse first presented).
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Gymnastics President Robert Colarossi to [the] USOC.”115  The let-
ter detailed the USOC’s and USA Gymnastics’ “fundamentally
flawed” methods for preventing abuse and urged the USOC to take
action.116  Additionally, Maroney’s complaint states the USOC
showed “an apparent indifference to the welfare of young women,”
evident by the eleven-year-gap between Colarossi’s letter and the
USOC’s first discussions of a handbook aimed at preventing
abuse.117  In response to Maroney’s and other USA Gymnasts’ com-
plaints, the USOC maintains that it was first made aware of the
“possibility” of Nassar’s sexual abuse in 2015 and immediately con-
tacted law enforcement.118  Throughout the proceedings, the
USOC and USA Gymnastics have spoken publicly in support of vic-
tims, but have not reached out to any individual athletes to express
sympathy.119
2. USA Swimming
USA Swimming found itself entangled with a similar series of
sexual abuse accusations almost a decade before details of Larry
Nassar’s abusive actions came to light.120  A study of decades-long
115. See id. (noting previous occasion where USOC could have taken action);
see also Hobson & Rich, infra notes 177–179 and accompanying text. R
116. See Winton, supra note 105 (noting claims of USOC’s “apparent indiffer- R
ence to the welfare of young children”).
117. See id. (noting Maroney’s suit claimed “the USOC took 11 years to create
a program and handbook aimed at preventing access to minors by sexual abusers,
and then ‘maintained its course and culture of ignoring abuse’”).
118. See id. (noting USOC continues to support Maroney as she speaks out
about abuse; however, maintaining USOC only became aware in 2015 and took
immediate action).
119. See Jere´ Longman, Will Larry Nassar Take Down the U.S. Olympic Committee?,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/sports/olym
pics/larry-nassar-usoc.html [https://perma.cc/GL5G-2JHY] (discussing comment
at Larry Nassar’s sentencing by Aly Raisman’s that “[n]either U.S.A. Gymnastics
nor the U.S.O.C. have reached out to express sympathy or even their support—not
even to ask: ‘How did this happen? What do you think we can do to help?’”); see
also Nancy Armour, USOC Needs to Answer for its Failing in Abuse Scandals, in Gymnas-
tics and Other Sports, USA TODAY SPORTS (Feb. 9, 2018, 2:47 AM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/winter-olympics-2018/2018/02/08/armour-olym-
pics-usoc-sexual-abuse-scandals-gymnastics/322431002/ [https://perma.cc/L82H-
CUJU] (discussing comment prior to start of Pyeongchang Winter Olympics by
Olympic chairman Larry Probst, saying “[t]o the women, both those who chose to
testify and those who did not, who have demonstrated tremendous bravery, poise
and strength in the most difficult circumstances imaginable, let me say this: The
Olympic system failed you and we are so incredibly sorry”).
120. See generally Nancy Armour & Rachel Axon, USOC Did Not Heed Sexual
Abuse Warnings in 2004, 2005, USA TODAY (Mar. 31, 2017, 6:16 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2017/03/31/usoc-sexual-abuse-usa-
swimming-senate/99826600/ [https://perma.cc/RE2U-2QJK] (discussing USA
Swimming allegations ignored by USOC).
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history of abuse in USA Swimming revealed more than 100 coaches
with lifetime bans from the sport.121  In an expose´ of USA Swim-
ming, a journalist noted that “[t]here’s a horror in the shadows of
American competitive swimming: a continuing legacy of sexual
abuse, usually involving male coaches who prey on young women—
and a governing body that looks the other way.”122
USA Swimming’s issues are illustrated by the story of Anna
Strzempko—an accomplished swimmer with promise for athletic
success.123  At thirteen-years-old, Anna led her club swim team to
nationals in middle-distance freestyle after it had gone through a
five-year drought, marking a turning point in her career.124  After
her race, her coach called her into her office, telling her she had
the potential to compete in the 2012 Olympic Trials, which were
then four years away.125  After her coach expressed this confidence
in her athletic ability, he allegedly raped her.126  When Anna met
her mother after the event, her mother wondered why Anna was so
subdued and not more excited at the news.127  Anna said she was
happy, just “shocked,” and proceeded to vomit the entire
evening.128
The abuse continued for the next two and a half years, with
Anna recalling her coach “periodically rap[ing] her in the storage
room just above her local YMCA pool.”129  To ensure Anna’s si-
lence, her coach continuously emphasized that no one would ever
believe her if she said anything about the abuse:
121. See David Ariviere, Long-Term Sexual Abuse by USA Swimming Coaches Docu-
mented in New Article, FORBES (Nov. 14, 2014, 3:24 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/davidlariviere/2014/11/14/long-term-sexual-abuse-by-usa-swimming-
coaches-documented-in-new-article/#26c6d83957e2 [https://perma.cc/8C6J-
JPPG] (discussing accusations within USA Swimming organization).
122. Rachel Sturtz, The Sex Abuse Scandal Plaguing USA Swimming, OUTSIDE ON-
LINE (Nov. 6, 2014), http://sol-reform.com/News/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/
The-Sex-Abuse-Scandal-Plaguing-USA-Swimming-Swimming-OutsideOnline.
com_.pdf [https://perma.cc/359N-DPXS] (discussing sex abuse in USA
Swimming).
123. See id. (noting Anna Strzempko was only 9 years into amateur career
when first raped by coach).
124. See id. (discussing Anna’s youth swimming success and Olympic dreams).
125. See id. (outlining Anna’s conversation with coach in which he first told
her she could have chance to compete in Olympic trials, then proceeded to slap
and rape her, leaving her lying on cement floor).
126. See id. (analyzing Anna’s recount of rape, after which the coach left her
“lying face up on the room’s cement floor”).
127. See id. (discussing Anna’s conversation with her mother after receiving
news from coach, as well as mother’s suspicions at her reaction).
128. See id. (referring to emotional and physical toll first rape had on Anna).
129. Id.
18
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol26/iss1/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\26-1\VLS105.txt unknown Seq: 19 21-FEB-19 11:54
2019] BETTER LATE THAN NEVER 175
Frozen by a mix of awe and fear that’s common among
young rape victims, Strzempko didn’t tell anybody about
what was going on. Out of guilt for losing her virginity to
her middle-aged coach, she never told her parents. Out of
shame, she never told her friends. She kept swimming, but
she tried to escape the sport in her own self-damaging
ways.130
Almost three years after the abuse began, Anna told a friend,
who immediately told Anna’s parents.131  Her mother reported the
abuse to YMCA officials, who suspended the coach.132  This was the
start of an ongoing legal and emotional battle for Anna, whose
coach continues to deny any wrongdoing.133  The local police who
interviewed Anna found that she “didn’t ‘act’ like an abuse victim,”
and police stated that Anna did not have a viable case without DNA
or an eyewitness.134
The Massachusetts Department of Children and Families’
(“DCF”) investigation found Anna’s story credible, and hoped to
remove the coach from the profession.135  Although the DCF ini-
tially ruled in Anna’s favor, the investigation ran aground when the
coach attacked Anna’s credibility on appeal and challenged the
DCF investigators’ procedure.136  In 2012, the YMCA fired the
coach without citing a reason, however, if another organization de-
cided to hire him, he could still work with underage females.137
Anna’s family also brought the case to the attention of USA
Swimming, the NGB of the YMCA swimming program.138  USA
Swimming conducted its own investigation and interviews, but
130. Id.
131. See id. (discussing first time Anna spoke out about abuse).
132. See id. (detailing Anna’s mother’s reaction and swift reporting to YMCA
officials, who suspended, but did not immediately fire, coach).
133. See id. (noting Anna is still pursuing legal action against coach, almost
ten years since first abuse).
134. Id. (discussing police response to allegations but their inability to pursue
criminal action because of lack of eye witnesses and no DNA evidence).
135. See id. (noting Anna’s family’s report to DCF, who pursued their own
investigation and supported her report based on her statement to police).
136. See id. (providing challenge made by Anna’s coach to ruling against him,
using tactics such as “bringing forth witnesses who spoke in support of his good
character and claiming that the kinds of encounters she described could not have
happened in a Y that was usually teeming with other people . . . [and claiming he]
never closed doors during meetings”).
137. See id. (noting YMCA fired coach in 2012 but did not make statement
and refused to discuss publicly).
138. See id. (explaining clubs perform under NGB, and in this case USA Swim-
ming was NGB responsible for YMCA swimming program).
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ceded its exploration of the case after the DCF overturned its initial
ruling on appeal.139  Recently, Anna and her family have hired a
lawyer to look into the possibility of pursuing legal action against
USA Swimming alleging a lack of institutional oversight and against
the YMCA for leaving a minor vulnerable to abuse.140  Many have
criticized Anna and her family for bringing down a beloved and
renowned coach in the USA Swimming organization, with one
teammate writing on social media, “no one believes you anyways
you stupid whore =).”141
In 2014, when USA Swimming’s executive director Chuck
Wielgus was set to be inducted into the International Swimming
Hall of Fame (“ISHOF”), Anna supported the Women’s Sport
Foundation’s petition to protest his induction.142  The petition ex-
posed USA Swimming’s unsettling history, as the myriad of coaches
with lifetime bans demonstrates, and Wielgus’ enabling of a culture
that looked the other way.143  The petition highlighted numerous
cases in which USA Swimming worked against victims of abuse,
rather than working with them.144  Ultimately, the ISHOF withdrew
Wielgus’ name from consideration.145
3. USA Taekwondo
The recent case Gatt v. USA Taekwondo,146 in which a coach
sexually abused three female Olympic hopefuls, further exemplifies
the issue of sexual abuse across the spectrum of all Olympic sport
organizations.147  The lawsuit alleged the USOC and USA Tae-
139. See id. (discussing USA Swimming’s decision to end investigation, notify-
ing Anna they would not explore case further).
140. See id. (discussing consideration by Anna and her family to pursue legal
action, hiring lawyer Johnathan Little).
141. See id. (noting many sided with coach, believing Anna was making claims
to seek attention).
142. See id. (discussing Anna’s support for WSF’s petition, along with
nineteen other women who have reported sexual abuse).
143. See id. (discussing Wielgus’ role in scandals as someone who responded
to outside pressures instead of as leader in protecting victims).
144. See id. (“The petition went on to describe some of the botched cases, the
ways in which USA Swimming had actively worked against victims of abuse, and an
alleged culture of cover-up and scorched-earth litigation that bought silence.”).
145. See id. (noting ISHOF’s decision to no longer consider Chuck Wielgus’
induction).
146. No. BC599321, 2015 WL 13754995 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 24, 2017).
147. See Compl. for Damages at 7-11, Gatt, No. BC599321, 2015 WL 13754995
(detailing allegations of sexual abuse committed by USA Taekwondo coach Marc
Gitelman); see also 3 Athletes Awarded $60M in Sex Case vs. Coach, CBS NEWS (Aug. 4,
2017, 5:28 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/3-taekwondo-athletes-awarded-
60m-in-sex-case-vs-coach-marc-gitelman/ [https://perma.cc/Q2SH-JDQE] (noting
20
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kwondo failed to protect the female athletes and “subjected the [fe-
male athletes] to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard
of the [female athletes’] rights and safety.”148  The female athletes
were awarded sixty million dollars by a Los Angeles County Supe-
rior Court judge in a default judgment against Marc Gitelman.149
However, they are currently appealing a judge’s decision to dismiss
the organizations as defendants.150
During a police investigation prior to the formal lawsuit,
Yazmin Brown, one of the athletes, filed a formal complaint with
the USA Taekwondo Ethics Committee (“the Ethics Committee”)
in September 2013.151  The Ethics Committee is responsible for
reinforcing the USOC’s Code of Conduct, which expressly prohib-
its any form of sexual harassment.152  In addition to her formal
complaint, Brown submitted previous Facebook conversations with
Gitelman, her coach, which illustrated the “extensive sexual rela-
tionship he pursued with her while she was a minor.”153  The two
other girls who ultimately joined Brown in the 2015 lawsuit also
provided detailed narratives to the Ethics Committee, bolstering
the credibility of Brown’s complaint with their similar experiences
with the coach.154  A disciplinary panel, after hearing the multiple
credible reports from the victims, recommended an immediate life-
time ban for Gitelman.155 However, this raised concerns that
Gitelman might sue under the Ted Stevens Act, claiming the panel
did not allow him a cross-examination and violated his due-process
award of $60 million to three female taekwondo athletes sued after being sexually
assaulted by Marc Gitelman for years).
148. Compl. for Damages at 24, Gatt, No. BC599321, 2015 WL 13754995.
149. See 3 Athletes Awarded $60M in Sex Case vs. Coach, supra note 147 (noting R
judgement awarded to female athletes after Gitelman failed to respond adequately
to lawsuit and was found in default).
150. See id. (discussing lawsuit by three female athletes, who were minors
when abused, noting coach repeatedly abused them from 2007 to 2014 and alleg-
ing that unusual relationship was well-known).
151. See Morton, supra note 14, at 159 (noting complaint originally filed with R
Ethics Committee for USA Taekwondo, going to Malia Arrington, Director of Eth-
ics and SafeSport for USOC).
152. See id. (quoting USOC’s Code of Conduct, which prohibits “any act of
sexual harassment including but not limited to requests for sexual favors, physical
conduct of a sexual nature by and between persons participating in the affairs or
activities of USAT directed towards any other member or person participating in
such events/activities”).
153. Id.
154. See id. (discussing two additional female athletes, who had similar exper-
iences, coming forward to Ethics Committee in support of Brown).
155. See Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (noting decision by disciplinary panel, R
recommending immediate ban for Gitelman after three women came forward ac-
cusing him of abuse).
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rights.156  Despite substantial evidence of Gitelman’s wrongdoing,
USA Taekwondo waited to ban Gitelman until his 2015
conviction.157
The complaint against Gitelman, which also named the USOC
and USA Taekwondo as co-defendants, alleged that he “invited the
young athletes to his hotel room to watch videos of their previous
taekwondo matches before he sexually abused them.”158  Gitelman
was convicted of multiple felony counts, “including oral copulation
of a minor, unlawful sexual intercourse and lewd acts upon a
child.”159  The judge sentenced Gitelman in October 2015 to more
than four years in prison and required him to register as a lifetime
sex offender.160
III. LEGAL VOID LEADS TO A HISTORY OF ABUSE AND LACK OF
USOC INTERVENTION
Why has the USOC sat back for so long amid all the publicity
surrounding sexual abuse and the Olympic sport organizations?161
The USOC has continuously asserted that they are “responsible for
athletes only in the short period from when they are named to the
Olympic team through a Winter or Summer Games.”162  At all
other events, the USOC places the burden of protecting and caring
for athletes on NGBs.163  In addition to the USOC shifting the pri-
mary responsibilities for athletes to NGBs, the USOC also claims
the Ted Stevens Act, which requires strict due-process for accused
abusers, limits the USOC’s ability to discipline abusers.164  This at-
tempt by the USOC to rationalize its decisions, “will seem like eva-
156. See id. (noting USA Taekwondo’s lawyer raised concerns of due process
rights in disciplinary process which resulted in disciplinary panel not banning
coach for fear of legal liability for USA Taekwondo).
157. See id. (noting despite credible reports, USA Taekwondo did not ban
Marc Gitelman until criminally convicted in 2015).
158. Leila Miller, Sexual-Abuse Victims Get $60-Million Judgment Against Former
Taekwondo Instructor, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-
now/la-me-ln-taekwondo-instructor-judgement-20170803-story.html [https://
perma.cc/52TM-KMZC].
159. Id.
160. See id. (noting Gitelman’s conviction by jury in Pomona Superior Court
in Los Angeles County, California).
161. See generally Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (questioning why child abuse in R
Olympic sport organizations continues to happen).
162. Longman, supra note 119. R
163. See id. (noting USOC has continuously shifted burden of responsibility
for caring for athletes to individual NGBs when events are not held at USOC
facilities).
164. See Townes, supra note 24 (noting various ways USOC removes blame R
from its own inaction in handling sexual abuse cases).
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sive legalese to many, an explanation few are likely to accept.”165
Further, with a legal void in the Ted Stevens Act and no indepen-
dent agency to work with abuse allegations, the system continued to
operate without checks and balances for decades.166
A. USOC: “Our Hands are Tied”
The USOC capitalizes from its athletes’ success and is quick to
celebrate their moments at the Olympic Games, but has looked
away when called to change a failing system for protecting abuse in
its organization.167  However, after years of claiming its hands are
tied, the USOC is now under critical review for failing to adequately
protect athletes.168  Placing responsibility on the USOC is not to say
that it must act as both police and prosecutor.169  Rather, it is the
obligation and duty of the organization to ensure a safe training
environment for children and athletes that should be incumbent
upon all constituents involved in Olympic sports, not shifted to a
single entity.170  As the top governing body in the Olympic struc-
ture, the USOC has the power and resources to enact changes
within and lobby for legislation that will prevent this abuse from
continuing.171
Year after year, the USOC and its NGBs sell the dream of
Olympic glory to children and families across the country.
They offer the allure of athletic accomplishment and na-
tional pride. What they don’t reveal is that their insuffi-
cient policies on sexual abuse could open the door for
predators. But it must stop. The USOC owes it to the ath-
letes to provide a safe environment for them to be the
next generation of champions.172
165. Longman, supra note 119. R
166. See Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (noting Ted Stevens Act requires writ- R
ten allegations prior to restricting person’s ability to pursue participation in Olym-
pics, therefore playing “recurring role in mishandled abuse cases”).
167. See Longman, supra note 119 (discussing Aly Raisman’s “scathing re- R
buke” of Olympic Committee).
168. See generally id. (discussing USOC’s lack of action regarding sexual assault
allegations).
169. See Townes, supra note 24 (noting “mere buck passing” nature of USOC’s R
claims that it is not responsible for sexual abuse cases).
170. See Maureen A. Weston, Tackling Abuse in Sport Through Dispute System De-
sign, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 434, 457–58 (2017) (“Every athlete has the right to
engage in sport free of physical and emotional harassment and abuse.”).
171. See id. (discussing how USOC could set example for protecting athletes).
172. Townes, supra note 24. R
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In 2012, the USOC first discussed making education programs
focused on preventing sexual assault and background checks
mandatory for all sports, but received major pushback from
NGBs.173  Officials for USA Softball argued that mandatory back-
ground checks would affect “competitive market share” and disap-
proved of a “top-down” approach from the USOC.174  Many
Olympic officials feared that victims would use a handbook as evi-
dence that officials knew the athletes suffered abuse and did not do
enough to stop it.175  However, the other approach to avoid legal
liability would be to stop sexual misconduct from happening in the
first place.176  It was not until 2014 that the USOC first required all
Olympic sport organizations to implement measures to prevent sex-
ual misconduct and policies to handle allegations.177  As early as
1999, the USOC knew that it had a problem and child athletes were
at risk, after USA Gymnastics CEO Bob Colarossi wrote a detailed
letter to the USOC.178  Colarossi wrote “[t]he USOC can either po-
sition itself as a leader in the protection of young athletes or it can
wait until it is forced to deal with the problem under much more
difficult circumstances.”179  For fifteen years, the USOC chose not
to position itself as a leader, and hundreds of children were victim-
173. See Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (examining USOC’s first attempts to set R
prevention policies in place).
174. See id. (discussing push back from several NGBs out of fear that abuse
prevention handbook would increase risk of getting sued by victims).
175. See id. (noting several Olympic officials expressed concerns that “the
handbook could get them sued by victims, who would use it as evidence that
Olympic officials knew abuse was a problem but weren’t doing enough to stop it”);
see also Diana Moskovitz, Report: Olympic Sports Dragged Feet On Protecting Athletes From
Sexual Abuse, DEADSPIN (Nov. 17, 2017, 6:38 PM), https://deadspin.com/report-
olympic-sports-dragged-feet-on-protecting-athle-1820560734 [https://perma.cc/
CLE7-R4NH] (discussing apprehensions NGBs had toward USOC mandate for
preventing and handling sexual misconduct allegations).
176. See Moskovitz, supra note 175 (noting prevention of sexual misconduct R
cases is best way to avoid suit).
177. See Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Documents: USOC Alerted to Sex Abuse
Problems Long Before Taking Action, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/sports/olympics/documents-usoc-alerted-to-sex-abuse-
problems-long-before-taking-action/2017/03/06/8ca2a89e-0230-11e7-ad5b-
d22680e18d10_story.html?utm_term=.abcb57dec6db [https://perma.cc/HJ9S-
2BKW] (discussing well-known issue of sexual misconduct within Olympic organi-
zation long before preventative measures were taken).  For further discussion of
minimum requirements under the new policy, see supra note 59 and accompany- R
ing text.
178. See Hobson & Rich, supra note 177 (reporting lack of basic—and com- R
mon—sex abuse prevention measures and USOC’s failure to combat issue once
alerted).
179. Id.
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ized as a result.180  Notably, across various sports, officials almost
always call the children “athletes.”181  While these talented athletes
were to be considered both children and athletes, they should be
seen as children first who need protection from abuse despite their
elite athletic abilities.182
Anna Strzempko’s story of abuse is only one of many amongst
Olympic sport organizations.183  Anna’s story illustrated the need to
improve policies in youth sports, because “the measures aimed at
protecting young athletes in NGB-affiliated teams are too frag-
mented and attenuated to provide proper remedies for coaching
abuse victims and [a]s a result, victims like Anna are bound to meet
resistance when they report abuse to their local club teams and re-
spective NGBs.”184  The approach of each NGB to combat sexual
abuse without strict regulation proved insufficient, as evidenced by
the creation of SafeSport to take over the primary responsibility
once resting entirely on NGBs.185  Most importantly, allowing NGBs
to create and direct their own reporting systems lacked the requi-
site independence and bias-free consideration.186  When a claim is
brought to an NGB, there is “an incentive to protect the sport’s
image and the winning coach, and to avoid liability and adverse
publicity.”187  Taking into consideration the financial costs of an in-
180. See id. (noting USOC did not implement mandatory preventative mea-
sures until 2014, fifteen years after receiving notice of problem of sexual miscon-
duct).  For a discussion on the rising number of victims of sexual assault in
Olympic sport organizations, see Hobson & Rich, supra notes 4–9 and accompany- R
ing text.
181. See Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (pointing out that during interviews R
with adults throughout elite USA Swimming organization, Victor Vieth, former sex
crimes prosecutor, noticed reluctance among coaches and parents to use word
“children”).
182. See id. (emphasizing number of children participating in programs).
Vieth was further quoted as saying the following:
You’ve got 320,000 children in your organization, and you need to see
them first as children before you see them as athletes.  There really was
the mentality of the possibility that this could be the next gold medal
winner at the Olympics, and that mentality was not just among the
coaches and the people running the groups; it was among the parents
themselves.
Id.
183. See generally Morton, supra note 14 at 173 (discussing Anna Strzempko’s R
story and growing legal concern of coaches inflicting abuse in Olympic sport
organizations).
184. Id. at 156 (citation omitted)
185. See Weston, supra note 170, at 444–45 (suggesting importance of inde- R
pendence for successful reporting system).
186. See id. at 445. (noting “[r]eporting systems directed by powers governing
the sport pose at least the appearance of lacking independence”).
187. Id.
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ternal investigation and the resources needed, private organizations
such as NGBs struggle to properly handle every case that arises.188
This burden is highlighted in the way all three previously noted
NGB’s handled sexual abuse allegations: USA Gymnastics, USA
Swimming, and USA Taekwondo.189
A culture of putting medals before athletes, avoiding legal lia-
bility, and maintaining reputation plagues the USOC and trickles
down to NGBs.190  USA Taekwondo, which waited to fire its coach
despite credible reports of sexual misconduct, is an example of an
NGB putting the possibility of a lawsuit for wrongful termination
above protecting children from future cases of abuse.191  This indi-
cates NGBs “might [have been] protecting their coaches at the ex-
pense of athletes’ safety.”192  It is rational to believe that an NGB’s
failure to remove a coach, reportedly shown to be an abuser, rea-
sonably suggests the coach will repeat the abusive behavior.193  This
inaction is conceivably condoning abusive behavior by the coach.194
When it comes to protocol for handling sexual misconduct al-
legations, there is nothing that inhibits the USOC or NGBs from
conducting an investigation and taking all steps to ensure the chil-
dren’s safety.195  The failure to act seems to come from a desire of
188. See id. (noting internal burden created when NGB’s deal with sexual
abuse allegations).
189. See Townes, supra note 24 (reporting most prominent sexual abuse cases R
arising under USOC regime).
190. See Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (discussing interviews and records that R
“highlight a culture in which limiting legal risk and preserving gold-medal chances
have been given priority over safeguarding children”); see also Weston, supra note
170, at 439 (discussing Penn State football scandal as “an example of the dangers R
of institutional reverence given to coaches of winning athletic programs and of the
potential for an institution or sport governing body to protect a coach over a vic-
tim to safeguard reputation and limit liability”).
191. See Will Hobson & Steven Rich, An Athlete Accused Her Coach of Sex Abuse.
Olympic Officials Stayed on the Sideline., WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/sports/olympics/an-athlete-accused-her-coach-of-sex-
abuse-olympic-officials-stayed-on-sideline/2017/02/14/35a6fc76-d2eb-11e6-a783-
cd3fa950f2fd_story.html?utm_term=.9cf972cb5e8d [https://perma.cc/T4AE-
Z5EN] (noting USA Taekwondo’s fear of coach filing retaliation suit under Ted
Stevens Act if he was fired for allegations ultimately won out against protecting the
accused athletes and future athletes).
192. Morton, supra note 14, at 159–60. R
193. See id. at 172 (“Additionally, when a coach is shown to have been an
abuser, an NGB’s failure to remove him from coaching or properly screen him
before allowing him to coach elsewhere suggests the NGB should reasonably fore-
see repeat abusive behavior.”).
194. See id. (discussing example of repeat behavior by coach and arguing
NGBs should be held accountable).
195. See Hobson, supra note 68 (discussing second hand abuse allegations not R
investigated, because of policy requiring written letter from parent before USA
Gymnastics took action).
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the Olympic sport organizations to avoid legal liability, to preserve
reputation, and to put gold medals above the children’s welfare.196
The USOC and the NGBs have historically chosen to shift the bur-
den, which arguably created a “culture and atmosphere that con-
ceal[ed] known and suspected sexual abusers.”197
B. USOC Recognized Its Failure When It Created the U.S.
Center for SafeSport
Despite the USOC historically claiming that it is not directly
responsible for preventing abuse in the organization, the creation
of the U.S. Center for SafeSport may indicate otherwise.198  While
the USOC continuously claimed protection of athletes is not the
organization’s responsibility, creation of this independent agency
suggests the USOC has recognized the challenges many NGBs face
when investigating claims of misconduct.199  Evidently, the USOC
recognizes NGBs may not be best-suited to create and sustain the
safest environments for young athletes.200  Officials sought to open
SafeSport in 2015, but because they had to postpone the opening
until 2017, analysts have not had the opportunity to assess the
center’s effectiveness thus far.201  Further, there are still questions
as to whether the USOC, NGBs, or SafeSport are liable in the event
of mishandling future cases.202
As an oversight entity with complete independence and exper-
tise in sexual misconduct, SafeSport certainly fills some of the gaps
196. See Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (noting Olympic sport organizations R
“highlight a culture in which limiting legal risk and preserving gold medal chances
have been given priority over safeguarding children”).
197. Winton, supra note 105 (discussing allegations that Maroney has made R
detailing USOC and USA Gymnastics role in covering up known sexual abuse).
198. See Meyers, supra note 49 (“[SafeSport] will respond to abuse claims and R
implement a unified set of policies for preventing, identifying and reporting mis-
conduct among the 47 national governing bodies (NGBs) that oversee USOC
sports.”).
199. See Weston, supra note 170, at 454–55 (quoting Malia Arrington, USOC R
Senior Director of Ethics and SafeSport, who said: “[o]ne of the greatest chal-
lenges many NGBs face is limited resources and expertise to investigate claims of
misconduct . . . . With this independent entity, we have the ability for the first time
to provide that resource to them so we can create and sustain safe environments
for young athletes.”).
200. See id. at 454 (“Justification for the Center is premised upon the need to
provide a centralized and national source of expertise in this area, which individ-
ual NGBs handling these matters often lack.”).
201. See Hobson & Rich, supra note 177 (discussing years of delays prior to R
opening SafeSport).
202. See Townes, supra note 24 (discussing questions about who is responsible R
when sexual abuse cases arise, noting it is ultimately USOC’s purpose to protect its
athletes).
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that have historically existed in NGBs own policies and enforce-
ment of policies.203  The creation of SafeSport “to provide a forum
to educate and train athletes, parents, coaches, and others in
preventing, detecting, and reporting violations is an important step
in ensuring athlete well-being and attainment of full potential.”204
This does not mean the USOC is absolved from dealing with sexual
abuse.205   A significant limitation of SafeSport is that it can act only
when it gets a report.206  Therefore, the “front lines of abuse pre-
vention” will remain those who are directly working with athletes:
“local clubs and coaches affiliated with Olympic organizations and
the officials who oversee those sports communities.”207  Further,
SafeSport has responsibilities similar to a college Title IX office but
does not have the same resources.208  For example, as of 2017, Uni-
versity of Maryland had a student population of fifty thousand and a
Title IX office with a full-time staff of seven.209  SafeSport had a full
time staff of nine and four contract investigators to handle a popu-
lation of thirteen million.210
Alongside SafeSport’s implementation, leaders in youth sport
must also take action to ensure its effectiveness.211  These actions
begin with (1) changing the culture in sport from focusing on med-
203. See Weston, supra note 170, at 454.  Explaining that: R
[SafeSport] is [d]esigned to be an independent entity which will oversee
education programs for safe sport, and investigate and adjudicate claims
of misconduct in sports that are managed by USOC-sanctioned NGBs.
Justification for the Center is premised upon the need to provide a cen-
tralized and national source of expertise in this area, which individual
NGBs handling these matters often lack.
Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation
omitted) (quoting Press Release, United States Olympic Committee, U.S. Olympic Com-
mittee Announces Formation of U.S. Center for Safe Sport Advisory Council (Feb. 9. 2015),
http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1033621/usoc-announce-nine-member-
united-states-center-for-safe-sport-board).
204. Id. at 458.
205. See Townes, supra note 24 (discussing USOC’s ability to protect its ath- R
letes and insignificant efforts USOC has taken other than opening U.S. Center for
SafeSport).
206. See Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (examining limitations of SafeSport due R
to requirement that those reporting to SafeSport be accountable and act first).
207. Id. (discussing result of limitations to when SafeSport can act puts re-
sponsibility back on clubs, coaches, and Olympic organizations such as NGBs).
208. See id. (comparing SafeSport to University of Maryland’s Title IX office,
which investigates on campus gender discrimination).
209. See id. (noting most of University of Maryland’s students and faculty, who
comprise population of fifty thousand, live on campus or nearby).
210. See id. (reporting SafeSport covers investigations involving athletes,
coaches, and officials throughout United States).
211. See generally Tim Evans et al., Safe Center: Is It The Answer to Athlete Sex
Abuse?, INDYSTAR (Mar. 22, 2017, 3:05 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/
news/2017/03/08/safesport-center-answer-athlete-sex-abuse/98775554/ [https://
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als to protecting children, (2) educating and training parents, ath-
letes, and coaches, and (3) eliminating one-on-one interactions,
instruction, or training between athletes and coaches.212  In addi-
tion, there must be a collective and established awareness, which
will give parents, coaches, and athletes an education and training to
prevent abuse.213
Further, Congress’ passing of the SafeSport Act “support[s] [a]
steadfast commitment to ending these horrific crimes.”214  With this
legislation, there are real criminal consequences for failure to pro-
tect and report abuse.215  Parents, volunteers, officials, coaches, and
athletes are all mandatory reporters and have a duty to report sus-
pected abuse.216  The SafeSport Act’s enactment gives the USOC
the tools to create a better culture; however, there is still tremen-
dous flexibility granted to the USOC and NGBs in the methods for
protecting abuse.217
The clubs are accountable to NGBs, NGBs are accountable to
the USOC, and the USOC arguably has believed it is the top of the
pyramid, unaccountable to any organization and immune to any
oversight.218  However, the USOC is, or should be, accountable to
Congress.219  By re-evaluating the Ted Stevens Act and establishing
the SafeSport Act, a legal duty ensures the USOC is accountable to
perma.cc/GTF9-SVN6] (discussing whether Safe Center will be successful and its
effectiveness).
212. See id. (arguing SafeSport’s need to remain independent to be effective,
as well as necessary actions to take regarding sexual misconduct).
213. See id. (noting creation of issue awareness campaigns and training and
educating not only coaches and officials, but also parents and community sport
organizers, will help get “upstream” and prevent abuse).
214. Groppe, supra note 87. R
215. See Associated Press, supra note 92 (noting criminal punishment of up to R
one year in prison could result from failure to report sexual abuse allegation).
216. See Alexandra Starr, New Legislation to Outlaw Failing to Report Sexual Abuse
in Olympic Sports, NPR (Feb. 14, 2018, 5:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/
14/585668348/new-legislation-to-outlaw-failing-to-report-sexual-abuse-in-olympic-
sports [https://perma.cc/AWK6-LHRX] (discussing SafeSport Act’s effect on eve-
ryone involved in athletic community).
217. See generally Gregory S. Love, Esq. & Kimberlee D. Norris, Esq., Preventing
Child Sexual Abuse in Youth Sport—New Federal Legislation Takes Extraordinary Step,
ABUSE PREVENTION (Feb. 2, 2018), https://abusepreventionsystems.com/wp-con
tent/uploads/2018/02/New-Legislation-Sexual-Abuse-in-Youth-Sport-2-2-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6RFW-KWXL] (discussing consequences of SafeSport Act).
218. See Mary Louise Kelly, Fallout Between USA Gymnastics and U.S. Olympic
Committee Continues, NPR (Jan. 26, 2018, 4:19 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/
26/581142523/fallout-between-usa-gymnastics-and-u-s-olympic-committee-contin
ues [https://perma.cc/V8LW-9GFK] (explaining structure of Olympic organiza-
tions and reporting system of each).
219. See id. (noting USOC does not have organization to report to directly).
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the law.220  Imposing a duty on the USOC and NGBs to thoroughly
investigate sexual assault claims and prevent their occurrence, in
addition to reporting them to SafeSport, makes the organizations
liable in the event a case is mishandled.221  Increased liability en-
sures that although victims cannot erase the emotional and physical
harm, they are properly compensated for the trauma they have
suffered.222
SafeSport’s biggest challenge will be making sure it has the
means and fortitude to fully investigate and adjudicate in a fair
manner.223  With backing from the codification of the SafeSport
Act, SafeSport now has more credibility and autonomy than when it
stood alone, but it must investigate claims even when they may be
controversial.224  In the case of Anna Strzempko, a coach’s reputa-
tion impeded the investigation and made for a large amount of
backlash.225  This is just one case demonstrating that acting on sus-
picion and, when necessary, using the full support of the law to
suspend coaches from participating during an investigation, is dire
for preventing sexual abuse in amateur sports.226  As a fully inde-
220. See id. (suggesting way to prevent USOC from mishandling cases involv-
ing sexual abuse is to hold them more accountable, as shown by Congress asking
for investigation into how case involving USA Gymnastics could have happened
under USOC).
221. See Morton, supra note 14, at 169 (“[A] duty for the USOC and the NGBs R
to properly oversee and maintain a safe sporting environment follows from that
special relationship.  Breaching that duty by failing to check the coach’s back-
ground or not thoroughly investigating sexual abuse claims would be akin to per se
negligence and entitle a victim to damages in a private cause of action.”).
222. See Lindsay Gibbs, Congress Passes Bill to Protect Amateur Athletes from Sex
Abuse, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 30, 2018, 4:45 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/con-
gress-bill-abuse-victims-d50642f8723e/ [https://perma.cc/CWY7-HTYF] (discuss-
ing importance of damages, both statutory and punitive, for victims of sexual
assault).
223. See Starr, supra note 216 (noting discussion in which former U.S. Swim- R
mer, Nancy Hogshead-Makar stated: “[w]hether or not SafeSport has—is going to
have the backbone to be able to get these molesters out just remains to be seen”).
224. See id. (noting SafeSport has immunity from being sued for libel while
conducting investigations).
225. See Sturtz, supra note 122 (discussing email by parent with concerns of R
inappropriate behavior by Anna’s coach and later that accused coach mocked that
email in front of athletes during practice, discouraging similar concerns from be-
ing raised again).  For further discussion of the case involving Anna Strzempko,
see supra notes 122–141 and accompanying text. R
226. See Sturtz, supra note 122 (discussing suspension of coach during pend- R
ing investigation by local police, his ability to continue working with young chil-
dren, and severe backlash that arose from coach and parents who did not believe
allegations); see also Jessicah Lahitou, How the Safe Sport Act Could Stop the Next Larry
Nassar, BUSTLE (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/how-the-safe-sport-act-
could-stop-the-next-larry-nassar-8162315 [https://perma.cc/E5TJ-G9PK] (detail-
ing new regime that SafeSport Act created, where Congress has created duty on
USOC to report suspicions sexual abuse cases).
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pendent agency, unlike an NGB with an interest in preserving repu-
tation, it is more likely SafeSport will be able to act in the athletes’
best interests.227
C. An Amendment to the Ted Stevens Act: Is it Adequate?
Prior to the SafeSport Act, the Ted Stevens Act gave unneces-
sary deference to the USOC and NGBs and their processes for
preventing abuse in the sport, failed to adequately provide reme-
dies for victims, and lacked a provision for placing liability on the
USOC and NGBs for knowingly retaining abusers.228  Strongly es-
tablishing the eligibility and participation framework for the
Olympic organization, the Ted Stevens Act’s language did not
speak verbatim to the issue of sexual misconduct.229  Rather, por-
tions of the law intended to protect athletes’ rights to compete have
often acted as a barrier to attempts by victims of sexual abuse to
have coaches or officials quickly barred from working with children
and other athletes.230  Additionally, there is no cause of action
under the Ted Stevens Act affording victims appropriate damages
after experiencing the trauma of sexual abuse.231
The Ted Stevens Act established that “the USOC is responsible
for overseeing Olympic sport in the U.S.,” acting as a regulatory
body supporting NGBs.232  Therefore, in instances of sexual assault,
when the USOC traditionally claimed NGBs are responsible for re-
sponding to these claims of misconduct, the gap led to the mishan-
dling of many sexual assault cases.233  In addition to the USOC
227. See 36 U.S.C. § 220541(a)(1) (stating SafeSport will “serve as the inde-
pendent national safe sport organization and be recognized worldwide as the inde-
pendent national safe sport organization for the United States”); see also Gibbs,
supra note 222 (quoting statement by survivor of Larry Nassar’s abuse as saying that R
“[t]here must be a thorough investigation. Time is not on our side.  We must act
now.  Time’s up.  Every minute that goes by with unanswered questions, more in-
nocent children can be harmed”); see also Lahitou, supra note 226 (arguing there R
should be far less bias in investigations of sexual abuse due to SafeSport’s
existence).
228. See Morton, supra note 14, at 157 (discussing failure of Ted Stevens Act to R
adequately address sexual assault).
229. See Townes, supra note 24 (examining language explicitly within Ted Ste- R
vens Act).
230. See Morton, supra note 14, at 152 (discussing fragmented Ted Stevens Act R
regarding handling of sexual misconduct claims).
231. See id. at 152–53 (discussing third issue sexual assault presents to NGBs).
232. Townes, supra note 24 (noting USOC traditionally does not involve itself R
in misconduct claims).
233. See id. (noting USOC continuously has pushed issue of handling sexual
misconduct claims to NGBs, claiming their hands are tied, leading to ineffective
reporting and inability to combat abuse, as evidenced by USA Gymnastics scandal
involving Larry Nassar).
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placing blame on NGBs, the USOC also claimed the Ted Stevens
Act, requiring strict due-process for accused abusers, limited the
USOC’s ability to discipline abusers.234  Prior to 2018, when an ath-
lete in the Olympic organization had a complaint of sexual abuse,
the Ted Stevens Act ultimately provided the arbitration process to
allege the NGB infringed upon their participation eligibility.235
The arbitration process has been found effective in some disputes,
such as athlete doping suspensions, however, arbitration as an ap-
peals process is unsuitable for sexual assault allegations.236
The SafeSport Act provides changes to almost all failing aspects
of the Ted Stevens Act.237  Not only does it extend mandatory re-
porting to adults in NGBs, it also extends to a wide spectrum of
amateur youth sport organizations through a “catch-all” category.238
Interpreted broadly, the SafeSport Act requires any adult working
with minors or amateur athletes to report immediate suspicions of
sexual abuse to SafeSport and law enforcement, regardless of
whether the organization is NGB-sponsored.239  One of the most
vital change in the SafeSport Act, however, is the requirement for
“prevention training.”240  To be effective, the training must aim at
stopping abuse before it happens, not reacting to it and providing a
remedy.241  Despite having no “visual profile,” sexual abusers often
exhibit recognizable behaviors that potential victims and their advo-
cates can spot before the abuser acts.242  While both reporting and
234. See id. (discussing excuses continuously made by USOC for why it has not
combatted issue of sexual abuse within its NGBs).
235. See id. at 157 (outlining Ted Stevens Act application to sexual assault
allegations).
236. See Morton, supra note 14, at 152 (noting ineffectiveness of arbitration R
for sexual misconduct allegations despite its effectiveness in employment context).
237. See generally Love & Norris, supra note 217, at 1 (arguing SafeSport Act is R
extraordinary step in preventing child abuse in youth sports).
238. See id. at 2 (discussing who SafeSport Act covers, noting broad extension
across youth sport organizations).
239. See id. at 3–4 (explaining requirement to report suspicions of abuse falls
on individuals working under NGBs as well as “covered individuals,” which in-
cludes participating adults for amateur sport organizations not sanctioned by
NGBs).
240. See id. at 4–5 (discussing prevention training as new part of SafeSport
Act, noting language in SafeSport Act which states “[a]n applicable amateur sports
organization shall . . . offer and provide consistent training to all adult members
who are in regular contact with amateur athletes who are minors, and subject to
parental consent, to members who are minors, regarding prevention and report-
ing of child abuse”).
241. See id. (arguing effective prevention training must be proactive rather
than reactive).
242. See id. (noting many sexual abusers exhibit certain behaviors prior to
committing abuse, making prevention training key to spotting these behaviors).
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prevention are important, “teaching millions of parents, coaches
and league officials how to prevent sexual abuse is truly ambitious
and groundbreaking.”243
Despite the above stated improvements, the SafeSport Act pro-
vides little direct guidance on prevention training and how to estab-
lish policies and procedures that prevent abuse.244  Studies have
found that one-on-one interactions between coaches and athletes
are a common theme in sexual abuse cases, but understanding the
“grooming process” of abusers in addition to limiting one-on-one
interactions is as important in preventing abuse.245  The grooming
process begins with an abuser gaining access through a program
serving children, selecting a child and gaining trust of the child,
her parents, and other coaches, beginning to engage in inappropri-
ate behavior, and finally attempting to keep the victim quiet.246
The new law requires NGBs to create “reasonable procedures” to
limit one-on-one interactions between minors and adults, but fails
to provide specific direction beyond this limitation.247  The “reason-
able procedures” should include a USOC universal policy, completely
eliminating one-on-one time between an adult and a child, there-
fore requiring the relevant NGB to seek and be granted permission
from a parent for anything contrary.248  A universal prevention
training should provide specific training that is tailored to under-
standing the grooming process and spotting behaviors that may
place a child at risk of abuse.249  Preventive training has the ability
to dramatically change youth sports:
If 20 million American adults are trained to understand
the offender’s grooming process through the training re-
243. Id. at 5.
244. See generally id. (discussing SafeSport Act and both direct and indirect
ramifications of new law).
245. See Love & Norris, supra note 217, at 7 (discussing grooming process of R
molesters and procedures preventing this as playing key role in preventing sexual
abuse); see also Evans, supra note 211 (analyzing study that revealed one-on-one R
interactions present in numerous sexual abuse cases).
246. See Love & Norris, supra note 217, at 7 (presenting four broad “grooming R
processes” abusers follow: gaining access, selecting child, introducing nudity and
sexual touch, and keeping victim quiet).
247. See id. (noting intent of SafeSport Act to establish policies and proce-
dures to prevent abuse, but also SafeSport Act’s failure to provide specific direc-
tion on how to do so successfully).
248. See Evans, supra note 211 (emphasis added) (discussing feasibility of R
blanket ban on one-on-one interactions, noting obligation would then fall on
NGBs to justify any such interaction).
249. See Love & Norris, supra note 217, at 7 (noting benefits to alerting par- R
ents and coaches to grooming processes and several behaviors that place children
more at risk).
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quirements of the Safe Sport Act, 20 million sets of eyes
will be better equipped to recognize predatory behaviors
before a child is victimized. As a result, children will be
safer in youth sport programs.250
This is a best practice and should be adopted by SafeSport on
behalf of the USOC as a strictly monitored training program and
prevention policy.251  The responsibility should be on the USOC
and SafeSport to ensure these procedures are universal and strictly
followed across NGBs.252  The USOC and SafeSport should also re-
quire proper training on the grooming process, rather than al-
lowing each NGB to implement their own interpretation of
“reasonable procedures.”253  The SafeSport Act is a big step in call-
ing for prevention policies, but without specific guidance on limit-
ing one-on-one interactions, there could be obstacles to its
effectiveness.254
The final policy in the SafeSport Act that has a significant ef-
fect is the clause for damages in civil court.255  The Ted Stevens Act
had an ineffective arbitration process after the grievance proce-
dures for sexual assault cases, which presented a serious issue for
victims and a lack of private remedy.256  To recover damages
outside of the arbitration process under the Ted Stevens Act, tort
law required finding a private cause of action, which in turn re-
quired finding that an internal dispute in the USOC’s governance
structure had infringed upon an athlete’s participation.257  The
lack of meeting both requirements in almost all cases negated a
private cause of action for athletes who have been sexually assaulted
by a coach, requiring the athlete to go through the unfavorable
arbitration process.258  Additionally, the USOC and NGBs argued
250. Id. at 7.
251. See id. (arguing “an understanding of the grooming process is the key to
establishing” procedures to protect young athletes).
252. See Evans, supra note 211 (noting NGBs will work with SafeSport to de- R
velop procedures).
253. See id. (explaining that NGBs will work with SafeSport to develop
procedures).
254. See Love & Norris, supra note 217, at 7 (noting legislation on prevention R
policies for sexual abuse is currently “weak”).
255. See 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (stating damages may be sought in U.S. District
Court for violation of SafeSport Act).
256. See Morton, supra note 14, at 162 (discussing private remedy under Ted R
Stevens Act, but also its serious limitations).
257. See id. (noting courts often defer to Ted Stevens Act because it favors
resolution through internal mechanisms rather than judicial systems).
258. See id. at 164 (discussing obstacles in tort law which force arbitration
placing athletes at disadvantage).
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the allegations arose from participation in the sport, and therefore
must submit to arbitration.259  That argument “[cut] against an un-
derlying assumption that sexual assault should not be an inherent
part of an athlete’s right to protected competition under the Ted
Stevens Act.”260  During the entire process, including arbitration,
there was unwarranted deference and positioning power given to
the USOC and NGB.261  This included a lack of opportunity for
appealing arbitration, privacy given to the NGB, and increased set-
tlement potential because of fear instilled in a victim, which is
favorable to the NGB.262  As in McKayla Maroney’s case, a monetary
settlement often also comes with an NDA.263  In private relation-
ships where no legally cognizable duty is owed, tort law does not
interfere; these obstacles for remedy are removed with the
SafeSport Act.264  Congress designed the Ted Stevens Act and its
arbitration process to settle disputes about Olympic participation or
positive drug tests, but the policy does not contemplate protecting
athletes and providing a remedy against sexually abusive coaches.265
The changes implemented in the SafeSport Act codified civil reme-
dies for victims and eliminated the need to rely on the inadequacy
of tort law.266  The SafeSport Act created a legal duty, therefore the
USOC, and all covered persons, may no longer deflect liability with
the argument that they are judgement proof because they owe no
legal duty.267
259. See id. at 162 (noting “the Act will only recognize an athlete’s right to
compete if an internal dispute in the USOC’s governance structure infringes upon
participation”).
260. Id. at 161.
261. See id. (noting similarity between advantages of NGBs and employers in
arbitration process).
262. See id. (noting arbitration presents challenges for victims, including
“greater privacy for the employer, enhanced settlement potential, and lack of op-
portunity for appeal”).
263. See Bailey, supra note 109 (noting that “because of a non-disclosure R
agreement contained in a settlement agreement Maroney signed with USA Gym-
nastics, Maroney could face a $100,000 penalty for speaking about her alleged
abuse or the settlement”).
264. See Lahitou, supra note 226 (“But with the passage of the Safe Sport Act, R
Congress has now taken that option away, making everyone involved responsible
for addressing sexual abuse that occurs on their watch.”).
265. See Morton, supra note 14, at 150 (noting Ted Stevens Act’s application R
to very “narrow” questions of eligibility).
266. See 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (stating victims of sexual abuse are compensated
with minimum of $150,000).
267. See Lahitou, supra note 226 (discussing USOCs reliance on “no duty” R
rules prior to SafeSport Act).
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D. NDAs: Should They Always be Legal?
The effect of an NDA is to silence a victim, and in the wake of
sexual assault allegations across industries, many argue they should
not be permitted, especially when sexual abuse allegations involve a
child.268  Despite the arguments against their legality, NDAs are
common features of many settlements and can often be a useful
tool that works in favor of a victim who wishes to move on without
gaining attention.269  In sexual assault cases particularly, NDAs ar-
guably have more to do with money and power than the law it-
self.270  California’s balance, prohibiting NDAs for the worst types
of sexual crimes, is a good model that should be followed by other
state legislatures.271
The SafeSport Act was enacted at a time of media outrage over
the sexual abuse in USA Gymnastics that spanned decades, without
claims to law enforcement and the USOC being taken seriously.272
This was partly due to NDAs keeping abused athletes quiet as part
of their terms.273  In many sexual assault cases, NDAs do more harm
than good because they allow perpetrators to escape solely because
they have enough money to silence a victim.274  These settlements
jeopardize the public by hiding sexual predators from law enforce-
ment and allowing the same perpetrator to repeat illegal actions.275
To change a culture of secrecy for perpetrators of sexual abuse,
several legislatures are proposing legislation that would, if enacted,
268. See Michelle Fabio, The Harvey Weinstein Effect: The End of Nondisclosure
Agreements in Sexual Assault Cases?, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/michellefabio/2017/10/26/the-harvey-weinstein-effect-the-end-of-non-
disclosure-agreements-in-sexual-assault-cases/#178b4f122c11 (noting in scandal
surrounding television producer Harvey Weinstein, NDAs were also part of settle-
ment agreements).
269. See id. (noting NDAs are common features in settlements where ag-
grieved party agrees to not pursue litigation or discuss terms of agreement with
others in exchange for money).
270. See Levinson, supra note 111 (“[S]exual harassment and assault is not R
about sex, it is about power . . . [and] [c]onfidential settlement agreements can
give perpetrators even more power over their victims by silencing them.”).
271. See Fabio, supra note 268 (noting that California prohibits use of NDAs in R
felony sexual assault cases).
272. See id. (“[NDAs] prevent the public from knowing about predatory con-
duct that harms [the public] and stop government officials from being able to
perform critical law enforcement duties that are designed to protect [the
public].”).
273. See id. (arguing NDAs allow perpetrators to retain continued power over
victims by silencing them).
274. See Levinson, supra note 111 (“Confidential settlement agreements can R
give perpetrators even more power over their victims by silencing them.”).
275. See id. (discussing use of NDAs to prevent victims from speaking out,
which allows perpetrators to act again).
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prohibit the use of NDAs in the settlement of claims for sexual as-
sault or harassment.276
Despite the harm NDAs may cause, there are arguments to be
weighed to the contrary on the issue of using NDAs in sexual abuse
cases.277  While NDAs have the effect of silencing victims, often be-
cause the threat of financial penalty if a victim breaks the NDA is
enough to keep her quiet, they sometimes prove to be beneficial.278
Many victims prefer to sign an NDA because an NDA protects vic-
tims from unwanted attention and public retaliation and gives fi-
nancial restitution, a large monetary sum.279  This financial support
allows many victims to continue living without a paycheck.280  Other
harms that come from prohibiting NDAs may include: (1) clogging
of court systems because without NDAs, parties may never settle
claims; (2) a slippery slope in which NDAs become unenforceable
in areas other than the context of sexual assault and harassment;
and (3) increasing government intervention in agreements be-
tween private parties.281  These compelling reasons for allowing
NDAs make it difficult to propose blanket illegality.282
The looming question surrounding McKayla Maroney’s NDA
with USA Gymnastics is whether it was legal.283  As a prevalent vic-
tim in the case, Maroney’s complaint against the NDA’s legality with
276. See Charles Thompson, Pa. Bill Would Ban Non-Disclosure Agreements in Sex-
ual Assault Claims, PENNLIVE (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.pennlive.com/politics/
index.ssf/2017/11/bill_would_say_no_more_to_non-.html [https://perma.cc/
QDR2-8BTD] (reporting that state senator from Berks County has introduced leg-
islation to prohibit NDAs in sexual assault or harassment cases).
277. See id. (noting people will be hurt if NDAs become unenforceable, but
also if opposite decision is made).
278. See id. (“Clearly, [NDAs] can cause real harm.  The monetary damages
attached to violating a non-disclosure agreement make it impractical for most vic-
tims to ever consider breaking it.”); see also Areva Martin, How NDAs Help Some
Victims Come Forward Against Abuse, MOTTO (Nov. 28, 2017), http://motto.time.
com/5039246/sexual-harassment-nda/ [https://perma.cc/UMC5-AZF9] (noting
consequences of breaking NDA require calculated risk).
279. See Martin, supra note 278 (discussing benefits of signing NDAs are R
sometimes high, particularly in cases where victims prefer to stay silent).
280. See id. (noting pros and cons of NDAs).
281. See Levinson, supra note 111 (discussing reasons weighing against prohib- R
iting NDAs).
282. See Martin, supra note 278 (noting benefits to victims signing NDA in R
Harvey Weinstein scandal include protection from being retaliated against or os-
tracized by an employer).
283. See Vivian Kane, The Very Existence of Non-Disclosure Agreements in Sexual
Abuse Cases is Despicable, THE MARY SUE (Jan. 17, 2018, 6:24 PM), https://
www.themarysue.com/mckayla-maroney-nda-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/ZVK6-
LQ53] (discussing question of legality surrounding NDAs in sexual abuse cases,
particularly with McKayla Maroney).
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USA Gymnastics received much notoriety.284  Because NDAs have
the ability to silence vulnerable victims of sexual assault and em-
power molesters, the SafeSport Act should create a provision
prohibiting their use when the SafeSport Act is violated.285  Part of
the grooming process for sexual abusers is silencing the victim
through threats, persuasion, and tools such as NDAs.286  Despite
the outrage over these agreements and the harmful impact on vic-
tims, the SafeSport Act is silent to the issue.287  To simply get rid of
NDAs in sexual assault or harassment cases would create serious
concerns, but that should not mean they can continue to be used in
cases similar to McKayla Maroney’s.288
IV. CONCLUSION
The USOC traditionally did not intervene in coach-inflicted
sexual abuse cases, claiming NGBs were responsible for combatting
the issue and abiding by the Ted Stevens Act.289  The scandal involv-
ing sexual abuse in USA Gymnastics, although just one of many,
brought light to an issue plaguing amateur sports.290  When over
150 women publicly accused Larry Nassar of sexual abuse spanning
two decades, a glaring discrepancy in the Ted Stevens Act was ex-
posed.291  It did not provide proper policies and procedures for
preventing sexual abuse in amateur sport and remedying victims.292
284. See Levinson, supra note 111 (discussing $100,000 fine that would have R
resulted against Maroney had USA Gymnastics enforced her NDA); see also Vagia-
nos, supra note 110 (noting NDAs are illegal in California for child sex abuse cases, R
and Maroney should be able to speak to whomever she wants about abuse).
285. See Levinson, supra note 111 (arguing that without some NDAs in sexual R
assault cases, some powerful men would likely have been stopped earlier, and fur-
ther that harmful effect of NDAs is exemplified by looking to dozens of NDAs
signed by accusers of abuse by Larry Nassar).
286. See Love & Norris, supra note 217 (noting “keeping the victim quiet” in- R
cludes “subtle or direct threats, shame, embarrassment, and access to team”).
287. See Gibbs, supra note 222 (discussing provisions included in SafeSport R
Act, which do not currently include language as to legality of NDAs).
288. See Levinson, supra note 111 (“By passing laws that ban all NDAs, we will R
marginalize rather than empower the people we’re aiming to protect.  Many of my
clients would never have come forward if they knew the only option was full public
disclosure of their experiences.”).
289. See Townes, supra note 24 (discussing USOC’s previous claims “that it is R
doing all that it can to protect athletes’ safety”).
290. For further discussion of sexual abuse allegations in USA Gymnastics, see
supra notes 100–119 and accompanying text. R
291. For further discussion of the Ted Stevens Act and the amendment(s),
see supra notes 228–267 and accompanying text. R
292. For further discussion of the Ted Stevens Act and the amendment(s),
see supra notes 228–267 and accompanying text. R
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The changes implemented in the SafeSport Act represent an
“extraordinary step” by lawmakers to prevent child sexual abuse in
youth sport.293  By making it a crime to fail to report a suspicion of
sexual abuse, punishable by up to one year in prison, a legal duty is
placed on the USOC, SafeSport, NGBs, coaches, parents, and ath-
letes across youth sports.294  Although the SafeSport Act is indeed
extraordinary, it does not erase decades of the USOC’s failure to
prevent young women from sexual abuse and continues to lack effi-
cacy in its direct preventative measures, including training persons
in detecting grooming processes by potential abusers and prohibit-
ing NDAs in cases of sexual assault.295
Sexual abuse scandals in many NGBs, such as USA Swimming
and USA Taekwondo, did not reach the same level of media scru-
tiny as USA Gymnastics.296  However, these scandals played a key
role changing a failing Olympic system.297  The SafeSport Act is set
to mark the end of an era of sexual abuse by changing the culture
of youth sport organizations and the Olympics and putting athlete
well-being ahead of medals.298
Alexandria Murphy*
293. See Love & Norris, supra note 217, at 1 (noting SafeSport Act and its aim R
to prevent sexual abuse in youth sports).
294. For further discussion of the legal duty under the SafeSport Act, see
supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. R
295. See Love & Norris, supra note 217, at 7 (noting SafeSport Act “stops short R
of providing specific direction beyond limiting one-on-one interaction between
adult and minor athlete”).  For further discussion of NDAs in cases of sexual as-
sault, see supra notes 268–288 and accompanying text. R
296. See generally Hobson & Rich, supra note 4 (discussing many coaches and R
officials within Olympic sport organizations that have been accused of sexual abuse
since 1982).
297. See Gibbs, supra note 222 (discussing origin of SafeSport Act dated back R
to early 2017, however, it passed in Congress soon after survivors confronted Nas-
sar in court about abuse).
298. See Starr, supra note 216 (noting focus of SafeSport Act is to promote R
culture where athletes’ well-beings come first).
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